The University of Maine

DigitalCommons@UMaine
Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Fogler Library

Spring 5-10-2019

Black Robes at the Edge of Empire: Jesuits, Natives,
and Colonial Crisis in Early Detroit, 1728-1781
Eric J. Toups
University of Maine, eric.toups@maine.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/etd
Part of the Canadian History Commons, Diplomatic History Commons, Social History
Commons, and the United States History Commons
Recommended Citation
Toups, Eric J., "Black Robes at the Edge of Empire: Jesuits, Natives, and Colonial Crisis in Early Detroit, 1728-1781" (2019). Electronic
Theses and Dissertations. 2958.
https://digitalcommons.library.umaine.edu/etd/2958

This Open-Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@UMaine. It has been accepted for inclusion in Electronic
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UMaine. For more information, please contact
um.library.technical.services@maine.edu.

BLACK ROBES AT THE EDGE OF EMPIRE: JESUITS, NATIVES,
AND COLONIAL CRISIS IN EARLY DETROIT, 1728-1781

By
Eric James Toups
B.A. Louisiana State University, 2016

A THESIS
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts
(in History)

The Graduate School
The University of Maine
May 2019

Advisory Committee:
Jacques Ferland, Associate Professor of History, Advisor
Stephen Miller, Adelaide & Alan Bird Professor and History Department Chair
Liam Riordan, Professor of History

BLACK ROBES AT THE EDGE OF EMPIRE: JESUITS, NATIVES,
AND COLONIAL CRISIS IN EARLY DETROIT, 1728-1781
By

Eric James Toups
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Jacques Ferland

An Abstract of the Thesis Presented
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the
Degree of Master of Arts
(in History)
May 2019

This thesis examines the Jesuit missionaries active in the region of Detroit and how their
role in that region changed over the course of the eighteenth century and under different colonial
regimes. Jesuits Armand de la Richardie, Pierre Potier, and Pierre du Jaunay influenced imperial
decision-making and policy in the eighteenth-century pays d’en haut through their notable
influence within certain indigenous communities. The priests were deeply influential during the
French regime as demonstrated by their impact on several colonial crises discussed in the text.
The Seven Years War and the conquest of New France by Great Britain gradually eroded Jesuit
influence as the distrustful British were reluctant to utilize the French Catholic priests as imperial
assets. As a result, the indigenous communities began to cut out the middlemen and deal with
imperial Britain directly rather than through a proxy. Despite these changes, the Jesuits still
shaped imperial realities through methods deployed under the French and new means made
available by the conquest. Pontiac’s War brought about a conclusive end to Jesuit political power

in the pays d’en haut as the British, ever suspicious of the French Jesuits, completed their
political ostracization.
Historians typically focus on the Jesuits of the seventeenth century when examining
colonial North America and rarely examine how the role of the Jesuits changed during the
eighteenth century and in different colonial contexts. This thesis seeks to demonstrate the value
in examining this neglected aspect of colonial-indigenous alliance and diplomacy by examining
how the Jesuits influenced several colonial crises that arose from the strategic colonial entrêpot
of Detroit.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
From its establishment in 1701 through the British conquest of New France in 1760 and
the early nineteenth century, Fort Pontchartrain du Détroit was perhaps the most important
imperial outpost in the pays d’en haut, the preeminent staging ground for the western fur trade,
and an important site for Euro-Native alliances and negotiations far beyond immediate oversight
by colonial officials at Quebec or Montreal. Hundreds of Odawa, Ojibwa, Potawatomi, and
Wyandot settled along the banks of the Detroit River between Lakes Superior and Erie in close
proximity to the fort and the resident French habitants, French and British soldiers, and
missionaries. Maintaining Native support for and attachment to the French, and later the British,
required constant diplomacy and an uninterrupted flow of gifts and supplies to grease the wheels
of cross-cultural alliance. Many of the pays d’en haut’s most serious crises, most notably a 1747
plan organized by Wyandot dissidents led by Nicholas Orontony to destroy the fort and expel the
French and Pontiac’s siege in 1763, erupted at this joint settlement.
Key to Detroit’s operation as a critical nexus of diplomacy and cooperation was the
presence of several Jesuit priests, most importantly Armand de la Richardie, Pierre Potier, and
Pierre du Jaunay, who played significant roles in wide-ranging relationships and events that
arose in the west in the eighteenth century. Histories of the Jesuits as pivotal agents of empire are
numerous and comprehensive for mid-seventeenth-century New France, but relatively
unexplored beyond the temporal and geographic scope of Quebec’s “heroic age.” The nature and
extent of French North America changed enormously during the eighteenth century.1

1

For an overview of seventeenth-century Jesuits and their actions among the Huron/Wendat, see
Bruce G. Trigger, Natives and Newcomers: Canada’s “Heroic Age” Reconsidered (Montreal:
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1985), especially 226-297. For the importance of Jesuits to
alliance in the seventeenth-century, see also Denys Delâge, Bitter Feast: Amerindians and
Europeans in Northeastern North America, 1600-64, translated by Jane Brierly (Vancouver:

2
As French military and commercial endeavors pushed into the pays d’en haut, the
colonial project changed dramatically in a geographic, cultural, and political landscape farremoved from the St. Lawrence River. The French increasingly committed to their role as
mediators in alliances with and among the disparate sovereign tribes of the western Great Lakes.
Most historians examining the eighteenth-century pays d’en haut acknowledge the Jesuit
presence, of course, but the priests’ political significance and day-to-day operations as
ambassadors has not been closely analyzed. Studies have typically focused on military officials,
secular diplomats, French fur traders, indigenous women, and tribal headmen while neglecting
the ever-present missionaries. Jesuits adapted to political realities far removed from the St.
Lawrence River as they pushed into the west. Due to the weakness of French military and
commercial presence in North America, the Jesuits of the early seventeenth century virtually
unchallenged by rival Frenchmen could monopolize French interactions with the Iroquois and
Wendat tribes, but the presence in the eighteenth century of rivals like French military officers
and an imperial program that often conflicted with the Jesuits’ priorities changed how they
interacted with French colonial authorities and the sovereign tribes. The Black Robes’
missionary goals frequently interlocked with but often contradicted French imperial and colonial
goals (themselves often at variance with one another), and it was in the intersection of a
disjointed colonial project where the Jesuit engagement with indigenous communities and
individuals was most important.2

University of British Columbia Press, 1993), 166-168. See also Kathryn Magee Labelle,
Dispersed but Not Destroyed: A History of the Seventeenth-Century Wendat People (Vancouver:
University of British Columbia Press, 2013), 101-102.
2
Richard White, The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes
Region, 1650-1815 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 36-37, 60. Gilles Havard
also acknowledges the role of Jesuits as diplomats, but does not examine how they influenced
events or why they were used as diplomats. See Gilles Havard, The Great Peace of Montreal of
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The Jesuits are in no danger of being forgotten or neglected in present-day historical
narratives, but historians of eighteenth-century New France, Native history, and French
colonialism elsewhere tend to narrowly assess the Jesuits as cultural arbiters in the context of
their objections to indigenous practices and attempts to impose their moral vision onto the
colonial and indigenous communities.3 The bulk of the historical literature about the eighteenthcentury Jesuits of French North America explores how they attempted to alter the sexual
practices of the French and Native women and their vehement opposition to selling liquor to
indigenous communities.4
The Jesuits are rarely the meaningful subjects of British Atlantic and colonial histories
except as outlandish villains. Francis Parkman exaggerated their role as the lynchpin of the
French colonial empire and modern scholars recoil from his pronounced prejudices.5 Yet, British
colonial officials clearly despised the French missionaries who supposedly instigated Native
1701: French Native Diplomacy in the Seventeenth Century, translated by Phyllis Aronoff and
Howard Scott (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 2001), 19-20, 95, 106.
3
For an overview of the seventeenth-century Jesuits as cultural arbiters, see James Axtell, The
Invasion Within: The Contest of Cultures in Colonial North America (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985), 279; See also Allan Greer, Mohawk Saint: Catherine Tekakwitha and
the Jesuits (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 7-8; Takao Abé, The Jesuit Mission to
New France: A New Interpretation in the Light of the Earlier Jesuit Experience in Japan
(Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill, 2011), 8-8, 12.
4
For treatment of Jesuits in French colonial historiography, see Richard White, The Middle
Ground, 36-37; Gilles Havard, Empire et métissages: Indiens et Français dans le Pays d’en Haut
(Paris: Presses de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2003), 302-303, 660, 705-706; Most
discussions of Jesuits and Native women in this context concern Marie Rouensa, a Native
woman in Illinois. For information on Jesuits, Native women, and métissage in the eighteenthcentury pays d’en haut, see Susan Sleeper-Smith, Indian Women and French Men: Rethinking
Cultural Encounter in the Western Great Lakes (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts
Press, 2001), 16-17, 23-24; Robert Michael Morrissey, Empire by Collaboration: Indians,
Colonists, and Governments in Colonial Illinois Country (Philadelphia: University of
Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 66-70, 77; Sophie White, Wild Frenchmen and Frenchified Indians:
Material Culture and Race in Colonial Louisiana (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2012), 40, 131.
5"Jay Gitlin, Bourgeois Frontier: French Towns, French Traders, and American Expansion (New
Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 10-12."
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attacks on British traders and settlers. Recent early American historians typically mention Jesuits
either to explain the mindset of French officialdom or to contrast the Jesuits with their less
successful British missionaries. As a result, Jesuits are surprisingly marginal to assessments of
eighteenth-century colonial North America. Relying upon the exaggerated suspicions of British
colonial officials, some historians have granted them a lofty but misleading station within the
French colonial empire. Several histories of Pontiac’s War have acknowledged Jesuit influence
in that specific event, but have not contextualized that influence with their earlier role in the
French colonial project and discussed them as avatars of the Catholic faith that sometimes
affected indigenous worldviews.6 The eighteenth-century Jesuits have fallen into scholarly
purgatory where they are noted as powerful but their actual day-to-day actions in alliancebuilding and diplomacy remain unassessed.
The Jesuit diplomatic efforts functioned within (and helped to create) the structures
elaborated upon in Richard White’s influential treatment, The Middle Ground, which explored
how the indigenous peoples of the pays d’en haut and the French colonial government negotiated
a space of mutual accommodation. This middle ground was maintained by a series of permanent
forts, outposts, settlements, and kinship and commercial networks that supported regular
communication and trade between French military and political authorities and the multitude of
indigenous communities operating in the Great Lakes region. This mutually beneficial alliance
6

Bruce Trigger, “The Jesuits and the Fur Trade,” Ethnohistory 12, (Winter, 1965), 30-33; David
Weber, "John Francis Bannon and the Historiography of the Spanish Borderlands: Retrospect
and Prospect," Journal of the Southwest 29 (Winter 1989): 354; Ann M. Little, "Cloistered
Bodies: Convents in the Anglo-American Imagination in the British Conquest of Canada."
Eighteenth-Century Studies 39, no. 2 (2006): 187-200; Daniel Richter, Trade, Land, Power: The
Struggle for Eastern North America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), 80,
115, 118; Gregory Dowd, War Under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations & the British Empire
(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), 20-21; Keith Widder, Beyond
Pontiac’s Shadow: Michilimackinac and the Anglo-Indian War of 1763 (East Lansing, MI:
Michigan State University, 2013), 53.
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system arose from an understanding of necessary obligations between the French and the
sovereign tribes to support one other against external threats, especially from the British and the
Iroquois, as well as internal ones, such as schisms among the groups who constituted the middle
ground.7
The Jesuits of French North America are most notable for their actions during the French
regime and it is between the years 1728 and 1752 that their influence at Detroit was most
powerfully felt. The first chapter of this thesis will explore Jesuit Father Armand de la
Richardie’s tenure at Detroit during this time frame. The preceding introduction will first
investigate several Jesuit-held principles and philosophies that guided their actions in the
eighteenth century, explain the general role of the Jesuits in the French alliance system, and
examine the order’s history at Fort Detroit before 1728. By examining the Wyandot relocation
and Nicholas Orontony crises that occurred between 1738 and 1751, the next chapter will clarify
the essential role that Jesuit diplomatic initiatives played in shaping events and imperial
functionality in the colonial pays d’en haut.
Jesuits did not immediately disappear from the pays d’en haut after the British conquest
of New France and Britain’s subsequent absorption of the French-Native alliance system. The
conquest did, however, eradicate the French institutional support upon which the Jesuits relied
for funding and political and social influence. The remaining Jesuits opted to adapt to British rule
and worked towards stabilizing the region and demonstrating their loyalty to the new regime.
Though severely curtailed, Jesuit clout persisted in the early years of British rule at Detroit. The

7

White, The Middle Ground, xiv-xv, 36-37, 60; Richard White, "Creative Misunderstandings
and New Understandings." The William and Mary Quarterly 63, no. 1 (2006): 9-11. Michael A.
McDonnell, Masters of Empire: Great Lakes Indians and the Making of America (New York:
Hill and Wang, 2016), 58. See also Melvin G. Holli, "The Founding of Detroit by
Cadillac," Michigan Historical Review 27, no. 1 (2001): 132-133.
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final chapter examines how Pierre Potier and Pierre du Jaunay, the Jesuits of Detroit and
Michilimackinac, adapted to the changing imperial realities of the Seven Years’ War, strove to
carve out a place for themselves during British rule, and collaborated with the British during
Pontiac’s War both through the methods they employed during the French era and new methods
developed as a result of British claiming Detroit and the pays d’en haut.
Lastly, the Jesuits of North America derived their influence in imperial and political
affairs by way of their deep relationships with indigenous communities. It is impossible to
present a meaningful history of the Jesuits and empire in North America without also examining
the indigenous communities within which they lived and worked. While the Wyandot, Odawa,
Ojibwe, and Potawatomi all called the Detroit River home during the eighteenth century,
Richardie and Potier interacted chiefly with the Wyandot. This thesis will attempt to
meaningfully engage with Wyandot history, lifeways, and social hierarchies for this reason.

7
CHAPTER 2: JESUIT POWER AT
FRENCH DETROIT, 1728-1754

The Jesuits of Detroit were at their most powerful under the auspices of the French
regime. Funded by the French Crown, deeply connected to the colonial government, and
possessing a more intimate relationship with indigenous communities than almost anyone else,
Jesuits like Father Armand de la Richardie were poised to direct the manner, for better or worse,
in which the French colonial government interacted with the indigenous allies upon which its
imperial clout relied. The manner in which the Jesuits inserted themselves in indigenous
communities and affairs also gave them sway within those communities in such a way that could
affect how they responded to political changes or tensions. Jesuit power was never absolute and
could not totally subvert the actions or goals of either the French or the Natives, but observing
periods in which the French-Native alliance underwent severe stress demonstrates that Jesuit
power in the pays d’en haut could and did significantly affect historical outcomes.

LES ROBES NOIRES AND CONTINENTAL INFLUENCE
The priests of the Society of Jesus occupied an opportune position to influence the course
of empire in the French New World. Their missions created an important foothold for future
relations between Natives and other European entities. French authorities typically established
fortified outposts and magazines to facilitate commercial and military operations where a Jesuit
mission already stood. Fort Michilimackinac, one of the most important French military and
commercial outposts in the west, was established at St. Ignace on the site of the Jesuit mission to
the Odawa. It became central to French participation in the fur trade and to their interactions with

8
the Odawa. Jesuits were present at every treaty and stationed near every fort, serving as
translators and diplomats in addition to their evangelization duties.1
Notably, the Jesuits were absent from Fort Pontchartrain du Détroit for the first twentyseven years after its establishment. Antoine de la Mothe Cadillac founded Fort Pontchartrain du
Détroit in 1701 and also served as its first commandant. He sold his vision for Detroit to Count
Ponchartrain, the French Minister of Marine, through outrageous exaggeration and flattery
accompanied by a grandiose vision of a new Eden nestled between Lake Erie and Lake St.
Claire. An outpost on the Detroit River would allow French colonial officials to monitor all
canoe traffic heading west on the Great Lakes. This would theoretically prevent the British from
contacting any Native tribes in the old Northwest. Cadillac also outlined a plan to invite as many
Native peoples as possible to relocate to Detroit, allowing for daily constant communication and
trade between the French and the remote communities to the west. Furthermore, Cadillac’s plan
to settle French habitants on the river to farm and mix with the Natives would strengthen
France’s claim on the region and facilitate a closer relationship with indigenous peoples.2
Any project to establish a settlement or outpost among the Natives necessitated some
kind of missionary, but Cadillac and the Jesuits had already developed an intense mutual
antipathy by 1701.3 Rather than appeal to the Jesuits for his enterprise, Cadillac instead

1

Daniel Hechenberger, "The Jesuits: History and Impact: From Their Origins Prior to the
Baroque Crisis to Their Role in the Illinois Country," Journal of the Illinois State Historical
Society 100, no. 2 (2007): 90.
2
Holli, "The Founding of Detroit by Cadillac," 134-136.
3
Father Étienne de Carheil to Governor Louis Hector de Callières, Michilimackina, 30 August
1702, in The Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents: Travels and Explorations of the Jesuit
Missionaries in New France, 1610-1791, vol. 65, ed. Reuben Gold Twaites (Cleveland: Burrows
Brothers Company, 1900), 189-193, 199-201 (hereafter cited in text as Jesuit Relations). Etienne
de Carheil, S.J., was the Jesuit missionary stationed at Michilimackinac, which Cadillac
commanded in the 1690s immediately preceding the establishment of Detroit. Carheil personally
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cultivated a friendly relationship with the Récollet priests, a Franciscan priestly order. The
Jesuits accompanied Cadillac during Detroit’s first year despite their animosity, but departed
before the end of 1701. Cadillac noted their resentment over a competing missionary order as at
least part of their reason for departure, stating, “that the Black Robes do not speak effectively
today because they are vexed at my bringing with me a Grey Robe [a Recollet], and because
priests are to come who have white collars. This annoys them because they would like to be the
only ones.” The Society of Jesus would not establish itself on the Detroit River until 1728.4
Cadillac sold his vision for Detroit on two main pillars. Firstly, the settlement would be
strategically significant for boxing British diplomats and fur traders out of the western Great
Lakes and for monitoring Native travelers moving into British or Iroquoian territory. It also
facilitated access and control over western trade, as all goods entering or leaving the pays d’en
haut had to pass through or near Detroit, theoretically making smuggling or clandestine trading
impossible.5 Secondly, Cadillac marketed Detroit as an experiment for future colonization
efforts. He invited the Wyandot, Odawa, Ojibwe, and Potawatomi tribes living in the upper
country to settle alongside the incoming French settlers and create an integrated settlement. This
plan harkened back to France’s imperial expectations at the very beginning of its colonial
enterprise. Officials at first looked to the francization, or “frenchification,” of the Native peoples
already living there to offset the small number of Europeans relocating to New France. Officials

blamed Cadillac for the failure to cultivate Christianity among the Odawa because of Cadillac’s
unrestricted sale of brandy to the regional tribes.
4
George Paré, The Catholic Church in Detroit, 1701-1888 (Detroit: Wayne State University
Press, 1950), 144. For the quote, see Jacques Valois, “Delhalle, Constantin,” in Dictionary of
Canadian Biography, vol. 2, University of Toronto/Université Laval, 1974.
5
Richard Weyhing, “‘Gascon Exaggerations’ – The Rise of Antoine Laumet dit de Lamothe,
Sieur de Cadillac, the Foundation of Colonial Detroit, and the Origins of the Fox Wars,” French
and Indians: In the Heart of North America 1630-1815 (Detroit: Michigan State University
Press, 2013), 95-96.
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and clerics believed they could frenchify the continental interior by incentivizing Native
communities to adopt French agricultural, linguistic and religious practices. In doing so the
French could stake their claim to the North American interior with a negligible European
population and secure the interior against inroads from other European rivals.6
The Jesuits had rejected francization as a viable missionary strategy by the 1650s. Rather
than bring the Natives into a closer relationship with Christianity, the Jesuits saw the close
contact with the French necessary for francization as harmful to Native communities and
especially harmful to Christian living. The union of French men and Native women in the façon
du pays was seen as an illicit sexual relationship outside the bounds of proper marriage, an
irregularity the priests decried often and loudly. Perhaps their biggest concern was the threat
European alcohol posed to Christian morality. Jesuits complained of years of missionary work
and steadfast Christian faith lost in the excesses of a single night of drunken revelry. Jesuit
rejection of francization does not, however, represent a rejection of colonialism or empire. The
Jesuits felt that this method of colonization undermined their missionary efforts and instead
pursued methods that they felt could facilitate alliances with the French without exposing the
Natives to the bad moral example of the French.7

6

Saliha Belmessous, "Assimilation and Racialism in Seventeenth and Eighteenth-Century
French Colonial Policy." The American Historical Review 110, no. 2 (2005): 322-49. France did
not consider racial differences a barrier to becoming loyal subjects of the Crown. Concepts of
race and nationality in the pre-French Revolution world were far more fluid than they would
later become.
7
Carheil to Callières, Michilimackina, 30 August 1702, in Jesuit Relations 65: 191-193. Carheil
considered French sexual liaisons with Native women to be the other most damaging activity
towards his mission; See also Robert Michael Morrissey, “The Terms of Encounter: Language
and Contested Visions of French Colonization in the Illinois Country, 1673-1702,” French and
Indians in the Heart of North America, 1630-1815 (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State University
Press, 2013), 47-49.
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Jesuits of the eighteenth century pursued an unorthodox and aggressively syncretic mode
of evangelization to secure the future of North American Christianity. Syncretism in this context
refers to how the Jesuits adapted their message to more cleanly fit within Native structure and
spirituality rather than impose a strictly Eurocentric Christianity. They largely rejected the state
as a Christianizing tool and instead tried to cultivate their own personal Christian garden among
the Natives. Their vision for Native Christianity placed the Jesuits themselves as the sole
Europeans present among the sovereign tribes as the primary conduit through which Christian
revelation and European civilization flowed. This also entailed chasing away the wolves that
threatened their flock, often manifested as other Europeans whose drunkenness, sexual
impropriety, and reckless pursuit of wealth, the priests alleged, undermined their Christian
nurseries. The Jesuits would have ideally submitted all congress between Natives and Europeans
to their purview and act as the ultimate arbitrators of frontier civilization in their authority as
North America’s ordained moral guardians.8
The Jesuits firmly believed that their divine prerogative to bring the New World into the
Catholic faith superseded all other European colonization goals. They protested loudly at any
intrusion that they felt jeopardized their mission. They did not, of course, oppose colonization or
European settlement at all times or even most of the time, but the Jesuits saw themselves as

8

The Spanish Franciscans in La Florida and New Spain pursued a similarly syncretic strategy for
the tribes to which they ministered. See Robbie Ethridge, From Chicaza to Chickasaw: The
European Invasion and the Transformation of the Mississippian World, 1540-1715 (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 2010) 78; For more information on French Jesuit missionary
techniques, see Catherine Randall, Black Robes and Buckskin: A Selection from the Jesuit
Relations (New York: Fordham University Press, 2011), 5; Peter A. Goddard, "Canada in
Seventeenth-Century Jesuit Thought: Backwater or Opportunity?" in Decentring the
Renaissance: Canada and Europe in Multidisciplinary Perspective 1500-1700, ed. Germaine
Warkentin and Carolyn Podruchny (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2001), 190-191; Sara
E. Melzer, Colonizer or Colonized: The Hidden Stories of Early Modern French Culture
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2012), 108-109.
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primarily interested in their indigenous flocks’ spiritual well being and took to their task with
this goal in mind. They supported and praised French settlement and colonization when they
believed it would aid them and opposed it when they saw European involvement as a liability.9
The tribes at Detroit remained without a missionary to minister to their spiritual needs
until the Wyandot specifically requested one in 1728 as a result of their objections to the post
commandant, Alphonse de Tonty. Tonty had been appointed in 1717 and immediately abused his
authority, exploited the French settlers, and drove up prices to line his own pockets. By 1727 the
Detroit tribes had had enough. The Wyandots petitioned the governor of New France to remove
Tonty and open up trade at Detroit to afford them better prices and better aid to the French.
Though their request to remove Tonty was made moot by his death, the governor recognized
their grievances and took pains to assuage them. Notable among these grievances was the
Wyandot request for a Jesuit missionary to be permanently stationed among them. The governor
responded immediately and Armand de la Richardie, who had previously ministered to the
Wyandot’s kin in New France, was dispatched to the Detroit River in 1728.10
Why did the Wyandot respond to Tonty’s abuses with a specific request that a missionary
be stationed among them? One cannot discount that some of the Christian Wyandot simply
wanted a priest to minister to their spiritual needs, much like any French parish without a pastor.
But there were additional benefits to entertaining a missionary that the Wyandot’s early
experiences with European religion had taught them, even for the Wyandot who preferred their

9

Kelly L. Watson, Insatiable Appetites: Imperial Encounters with Cannibals in the North
Atlantic World (New York: New York University Press, 2015), 124-125.
10
For Tonty’s abuses of power, see “Petition from Detroit Citizens to Recover Their Rights,”
Detroit, 1727, in Michigan Pioneer and Historical Society Collections, vol. 34, ed. The Society
… (Lansing, MI: Wynkoop Hallenbeck Crawford Co., 1905), 38-40 (hereafter cited in text as
MPHC). For the Wyandot petition, see Huron tribe to Beauharnois, Detroit, 9 August 1727, in
MPHC 34: 49-51. See also White, The Middle Ground, 177-178.
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own spiritual customs. The Wyandot had encountered Christianity before almost any other
sovereign tribe and had enjoyed close relations with the Jesuits long before their relocation to
Detroit. Jesuits interacted with their assigned communities on a face-to-face basis, and thus
possessed intimate details of the inner workings of the tribes. The respect that Jesuit priests
received from French officials made them excellent liaisons through which the Wyandot could
strategically transmit their grievances and expect a rapid response.

MISSIONARY IN THE MIDDLE GROUND
Father Armand de la Richardie learned valuable lessons in Native customs and reciprocal
power relations in his early years at the Detroit settlement that he later applied during the
upheavals and crises of the 1740s. His efforts to win sway among the Wyandot and to convert
them to Christianity are particularly important because they demonstrate exactly how a
missionary’s methods could affect the entire tribe. Richardie would later apply the lessons
learned in his early years of evangelization to influence the Wyandot during and after the
Orontony crisis.
Richardie characterized his initial time spent among the Wyandot as frustrating and
fruitless:
When I arrived here I found not a single savage professing the Christian faith, although
some of the older ones, while suffering from sickness, had formerly been washed in the
sacred waters by the first missionaries. About forty years ago, shaking the dust from their
feet, they had abandoned that nation, which was uncircumcised in heart.11
11

Richardie to Retz, Mission de l’Assumption, 21 June 1741, in Jesuit Relations 69: 49. The
phrase ‘uncircumcised in heart’ would mean that the tribe had closed itself off from God’s
influence. Circumcision was a physical representation of the Israelites’ covenant with God. To
be “uncircumcised in heart” thus represents the Wyandot’s supposed refusal to participate in the
covenant between God and the Catholic Church. The phrase is common in both the Old and New
Testaments of the Christian Bible. Richardie also quotes the Gospel of Matthew with the phrase
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In this account, written in the midst of French-Wyandot tensions in 1741, Richardie exaggerates
their situation to make the case for his own exemplary behavior as a missionary. Earlier visitors
to Detroit like Pierre François Xavier de Charlevoix in 1721 had characterized the Wyandot as
Christian but lacking a missionary. The Wyandot had been the first large indigenous confederacy
in the Northeast to accept Christianity and, judging by their specific request for a missionary in
1727, they wished to continue in their practice of that faith. Charlevoix’s reports on Detroit in
1721 noted that the majority of the Wyandot professed at least some form of Christian faith, with
only a few of the elders resisting conversion. Richardie did not start with as infertile a garden as
he would have had his superiors believe. The challenges Richardie faced instead seem to stem
from his struggle to be accepted by the Wyandot as a spiritual leader. Richardie interpreted the
tribe’s reluctance to accept his spiritual authority as paganism writ large.12
Despite these exaggerations, Richardie still managed to deepen his bond to the tribe and
its power structure. Wyandot society organized itself into three main groupings called phratries
and subdivided into nine clans. The phratry chiefs acted as the principal chiefs of the Wyandot
with the clan leaders acting as auxiliaries. The clans further subdivided into cabins that could
hold anywhere between four and forty tribespersons. Wyandot elders and the leaders of
individual longhouses were influential in their clans and a valuable foothold for any European
entity hoping to establish itself within the community. Richardie approached these powerful

town refused to welcome them or pay heed to their words. Richardie thus compares his Jesuit
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tribal leaders to strengthen his position within the tribe and hasten their acceptance of him as
their spiritual guide.13
The Jesuit priests, in the pays d’en haut as in the Wyandot homeland of Wendake, often
depended on Native women to influence the men of the tribe to adopt Christianity. Wyandot
women did not hold official positions of power or speak at councils, but items and proposals
could not be addressed unless a woman, typically an elder, chose a man to act as an advocate and
present her concerns before the tribe. Jesuits in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries tried to
convert the tribes they visited and did so by winning over particularly powerful orators, elders,
and chiefs. This first required the Jesuits to win over an influential woman who could then
convince a headman to advocate for conversion on her behalf. By acting through the female
elders and their male proxies, Jesuits attempted and often succeeded in converting a tribe by way
of its power structure rather than trying to specifically win over the people on an individual
basis.14
Richardie won great influence with the Deer clan, the preeminent Wyandot clan led by
the Wyandot principal chief, Sataretsy. He was formally adopted into the Deer clan and enjoyed
a successful streak of baptisms in his early years among them. Wyandot women played a central
role in his acceptance within tribal confidence as only the women could request an outsider be
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adopted as fictive kin. While Richardie exaggerated his own success among the Wyandot, he still
managed to secure an influential position in the tribe by way of its embrace of Christianity.15
Beyond his capacity as a spiritual emissary for the Catholic Church, Richardie also
played a noteworthy role as an emissary for the French colonial state. In serving as an emissary
for the French, Richardie acted as both the arbiter of French imperial goals and a constant
negotiator for the nature of the father-child diplomatic obligations of the French-Native
alliance.16 Richardie’s daily interactions with the Wyandot and strong ties to its power structure
made him a one-man consulate through which the French could both transmit and receive
requests to and from the Wyandot. The French waged war against the Mesquakie tribe, whom
the French called the Foxes, through the 1730s and depended on the allied tribes settled at or
near Detroit to pressure and attack them. Pierre Jacques Payen de Noyan depended on Richardie
to gauge tribal sentiments during the Fox Wars, writing to the French colonial minister, “The
hurons and the Outawas [Odawa] of detroit, whom I Commanded, have caused father de la
richardie to write to me several times that they Were ready to follow me.” De Noyan’s
communications with the Ministry of Marine cite Richardie as the French informant on tribal
attitudes and as the medium for expressing military commitment to the French alliance. The
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Wyandot and Odawa are specifically noted as dispatching Richardie to transmit messages on
their behalf.17

WYANDOT RELOCATION
Intertribal disputes on the Detroit River disrupted the relative stability the region had
enjoyed since the end of the Fox wars in the early 1730s. Conflict erupted between the Wyandot
and Odawa that threatened to throw the entire Detroit enterprise into disarray. The Odawa
implicated the Wyandot for leaking information about an Odawa raid against a southern tribe
that resulted in several Odawa deaths. The Odawa held the Wyandot personally responsible for
their losses, claiming to have witnessed a Wyandot warrior at the battle killing a close relative.18
Tensions became so heated that the Wyandot feared for their safety at Detroit and
beseeched the French to intercede on their behalf. The official commandant, Jacques Payen de
Noyan, was not actually present at Detroit at this stage and operated primarily through a proxy,
seasoned colonial officer Nicolas-Joseph Denoyelles. Governor Charles de Beauharnois, De
Noyan, and Denoyelles attempted to pacify the two tribes with gifts and protection, but these
promises did little to assuage Wyandot fear or Odawa anger. The Wyandot had maintained a
small clearing near Sandusky Bay on the southern shore of Lake Erie as a winter settlement.
Against their usual customs, the entire tribe left for Sandusky during the 1738-1739 winter for
fear of attack by the Odawa. Richardie, asserting that he understood the Wyandot mind, wrote to
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Beauharnois that, “the Huron [Wyandot] will not be easily reassured and that [Richardie] has a
compelling reason to think they may defect to the Sonontouans [Seneca] or flee to the belle
Rivière [Ohio River].”19 Denoyelles went to Sandusky Bay in February 1739 and promised
complete Wyandot safety at Detroit. Nicholas Orontony, an early and active Wyandot convert to
Christianity and leader of the Porcupine clan, met with Denoyelles upon his return to Detroit and
requested on behalf of the tribe that the French allow the Wyandot to relocate and settle closer to
the French.20
Interim Commandant Denoyelles demonstrated a general ignorance of Wyandot tribal
structure and internal power dynamics. Firstly, he identifies Orontony as “the great chief of that
tribe,” when that title belonged to Sastaretsy. Orontony was a minor leader and directly
subordinated to a man named Anguirot, who headed the Turtle phratry. Orontony was prominent
among the Wyandot, but he acted only as an emissary and had no standing to make decisions for
the whole tribe at this time. Denoyelles and Commandant De Noyan, when he finally arrived to
assume his post, would repeatedly refer to him as one of the three great chiefs of the Wyandot.
This misunderstanding of Orontony’s authority within the tribe, when coupled with successive
weak attempts to placate Wyandot fears and Odawa anger, marks a recurring pattern of French
ignorance of Wyandot politics and concerns. Beauharnois, Denoyelles, and De Noyan
subsequently deferred to Richardie and other Jesuit priests for their information regarding the
tribe and to relay their concerns.21
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Losing faith that the French would come through for them, some among the Wyandot
began to scout other options. Richardie struggled to assert control over these discussions,
ultimately relying on his Native supporters and friends. He relied upon the female Wyandot
elders on at least one occasion to prevent a flight to Seneca territory in western Pennsylvania. At
some point during the retreat to Sandusky, the Wyandot dispatched an emissary to make
overtures to the British and exchanged a wampum belt as a form of semi-official treaty.
Departing Detroit and arriving at Sandusky brought the Wyandot further away from French
observation and closer to potential British overtures. Thus, their flight to Sandusky indicates both
misgivings about French protection and an openness to ally with the British. While the Wyandot
did not reject the French, they sensibly played the field to negotiate for a better option.22
Though Richardie initially supported relocating the Wyandot closer to Quebec or
Montreal, he began to steer events on a course of his own choosing by 1740. His letter to Father
Saint-Pé, the Jesuit Superior of New France, in 1740 demonstrates a meaningful if patronizing
and disdainful understanding of Wyandot customs. The Wyandot daily asked Richardie to write
to the governor on their behalf in the hope that he would aid them in their relocation. Though
Beauharnois and De Noyan, having finally assumed his post, were both at this point ready to
relocate the Wyandot to Montreal, they had neither satisfied Wyandot tradition nor their actual
desired place of relocation. Richardie wrote:
There is no Change in their project of going to Settle near you. The only thing that
Hinders the Carrying out of the project, is Savage vanity that does not wish to appear to
flee, and seeks to Conceal its fear, by saying to the neighboring Nation, that they are
being taken from their fire, in order that another may be kindled for them. I am urged
daily to Induce Monsieur the General to send a message by which he will Remove them
22
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from here and settle near him. This is but a pretext. The Truth is that they wish it to be the
people of the Sault or of the Lake [Sault St. Louis and Lac des Deux Montagnes, both
near Quebec]. The latter are no friends of mine as you might imagine. Thus, if Monsieur
the General wishes to Grant their prayer, the people of the Sault must be their agents and
their deputation must come here next spring to exercise the gentle pressure that is
desired.23
This letter between Richardie and Saint-Pé reveals both Richardie’s goals and motive
during the crisis and his willingness to act against French designs in order to pursue his own
purposes. The tribe refused to relocate for fear of showing weakness of submission. Relocation
would permanently mark them as French dependents and cripple their ability to negotiate
autonomy in their new location. They would lose face to the other tribes allied with the French,
especially the Odawa.24 In order to preserve their elevated standing with the French-Native
alliance, the Wyandot insisted on relocating only for the well-being of their wives and children
with proper decorum and only if a good place was prepared for them beforehand among their
kin. Richardie recognized these designs to maintain their tribal sovereignty, derisively decrying
their “savage vanity.” Though he understood Wyandot motives, he saw their attempts to
maintain ritual sovereignty as disobedient. Realizing that the Wyandot would only relocate on
their own terms, Richardie recommended that emissaries from the Laurentian Iroquois settlement
at Sault St. Louis, also called Kahnawake, would be necessary to induce the tribe to relocate.25
The letter to Saint-Pé further reveals Richardie’s agenda in these affairs: to monopolize access to
the Wyandot for evangelization. He concluded his missive to Saint-Pé by writing:
23
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It is that, to allay their continual alarms, [the governor will] allow them to establish
themselves three leagues from here on an island called grosse isle. There, they say, as
they will see no more Outaouacs [Odawa], they will be a little more in peace. Notwithstanding the Labors entailed by a New Establishment I am in accord with their
desires, convinced as I am that their destruction is manifest, and will never be due to
anything but their proximity to and their mingling with the French and faithless nations.26
A Sulpician missionary named François Piquet, whose order Richardie referred to as “no
friends of mine,” ministered to the Natives of the Lac de Deux Montagnes. The Jesuits resented
any interference in their mission, even from other Catholic missionaries, and rejected any
arrangement that they felt would endanger their vision for a garden of Christianity shepherded by
the robes noires alone. Richardie felt that close proximity to the French’s bad example and,
perhaps more importantly, their alcohol, would become a lethal blight for the Christian harvest.
On the other hand, relocating the Wyandot to the Lake of Two Mountains would remove them
from Jesuit authority. Staying at Detroit was equally unacceptable, both for the danger it
represented and its proximity to the “faithless Nations” of the Anishinaabe. Grosse Isle
represented a novel solution for the priest. The island was close enough to Detroit to supply
Richardie’s mission, but theoretically distant enough to guarantee Wyandot safety. The Wyandot
would stay removed from the French without moving them closer to the British by way of
Sandusky Bay. Any French authority figure other than Richardie would be at least a day’s canoe
ride away, allowing Richardie to monopolize access to the tribe. Richardie had more sustained
daily contact with the Wyandot than any other Frenchman, having spent seven months during the
previous winter at the Sandusky Bay village, and had more opportunity to campaign for his own
vision for the Wyandot than any other European. Because most petitions the Wyandot made of
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the French were communicated through the priest, his control of the message allowed him to
undermine certain authority figures.27
As this dispute persisted, fissures opened up within the Wyandot tribe itself. The quarrel
elaborated the conflict between Anglophile and Francophile elements within the tribe. The three
phratry chiefs disagreed on whether or not to relocate. Sastaretsy and Tayetchatin, leaders of the
Deer and Wolf phatries, favored relocating to be closer to the French. Anguirot, leader of the
Turtle phratry, supported remaining in Sandusky. Anguirot was the phratry leader who initiated
the first retreat to Sandusky Bay after the initial tension with the Odawa. Richardie despised
“The Drunkard Angouirot” and tried to exclude him from councils and tribal decision-making as
much as possible. He further isolated Anguirot by building stronger ties with Sastaretsy and
Tayetchatin and siding with them as they faced growing dissent from the young men of the
tribe.28 It often fell to Nicholas Orontony, as Anguirot’s most prominent subordinate, to fill the
gap left by the exclusion of the phratry’s leader.29 Despite Richardie’s attempts to exclude him,
Anguirot remained an influential voice within the Wyandot with whom the French had to reckon.
When Governor-General Charles Beauharnois sent his nephew, Claude-Charles de Beauharnois,
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to negotiate relocation with the Wyandot, he transmitted an order to Richardie to stop
undermining the chief:
Several persons have told me that you did not like him[Anguirot]; that you would not
admit him to any Council; that his people had spoken and he had said nothing; and that
when he saw me he would show me that he has reason to complain because you represent
him to me as a dangerous and pernicious individual. On an occasion like this it is
advisable, rather, to appear to have confidence in him, so as not to disgust him, and thus
to induce him not to thwart my purpose.30
Beauharnois dispatched his nephew to Detroit to organize a secret council with the
Wyandot followed by a general council of the Odawa, Potawatomi, and Ojibwa to finalize
Wyandot relocation. He was tasked to relocate the Wyandot as soon as possible, either before
winter fell or immediately after it ended. Governor Beauharnois also requested that Richardie
assist his nephew, Chevalier Claude-Charles de Beauharnois to the best of his ability to finalize
the relocation. Though the governor had expressed misgivings regarding Richardie’s dealings
with Anguirot, he expressed explicit trust that both the Chevalier de Beauharnois and the Jesuit
would carry out the task as envoys of New France.31
The mission did not go as planned. A nearly empty Wyandot village greeted the
Chevalier de Beauharnois upon his arrival in late June, with only Anguirot and a few other elders
remaining. His initial prognosis was grim. The Wyandot seemed almost entirely demotivated to
relocate to the east. The Chevalier attempted to loosen Anguirot’s lips with liquor in keeping
with his reputation, but the old chief moderated himself and acted with “a cunning and subtle
mind, the ability of an accomplished politician.” The Chevalier spent a month on the Detroit
River visiting the other tribes and the few Wyandot who remained before departing to Sandusky
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Bay to treat with the bulk of the tribe. A new idea to settle at the nearby Grosse Isle had grown to
such a level that the Chevalier saw it as another major obstacle by the time he departed for
Sandusky Bay in August with Richardie in tow.32
Suspicious of the Chevalier’s friendship with the Sulpician missionaries, Richardie
appears to have done all he could to sabotage his mission to relocate the Wyandot. Swearing,
“the hurons will never wish to have any other Missionaries than us,” Richardie quarreled with
the Chevalier for fear that he might threaten the Jesuit hegemony on missions to the tribes. In his
letters to a fellow Jesuit, Father du Jaunay, Richardie criticized both the Chevalier and the
Governor’s incompetence in dealing with the affair. Though the Chevalier returned to the
Governor with Sastaretsy, Tayetchatin, and Orontony in tow, Richardie was convinced these
negotiations would go nowhere. Richardie also lied about non-existent orders from Beauharnois
to reestablish his mission on Grosse Isle.33
The disarray sewn by Richardie, combined with the internal discord among the Wyandot
elders and young men, scuttled the tribe’s motivation and the French ability to relocate them.
The disagreement between the elders and the young men of the tribe as well as the swell of
contradictory rumors confused and paralyzed the relationship with the Wyandot. Beauharnois,
having by September 1742 procured some of Richardie’s letters to his fellow priests, laid the
blame squarely on the Jesuit:
The conduct of the Chiefs toward my nephew, did not originate with them, but Was
inspired by their Missionary, and I can give you no better proof of this, Monseigneur,
than to Send you an Extract from his Letter Written to Father Du-jaunay in the month of
December, 1741, wherein the whole Mystery is unveiled, and the proof thereof results
from Information I have Had.34
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Forced to abandon his plan for Grosse Isle, Richardie petitioned the Wyandot to settle at
Bois Blanc Island and the adjacent coast a few miles south of Detroit. He reestablished his
mission on Bois Blanc Island and, by 1744, had succeeded in attracting a large portion of
Wyandot Christians to settle nearby. But Richardie’s success in attracting members of the tribe
to Bois Blanc Island came at the expense of tribal unity. While Sastaretsy, Tayetchatin, and their
cohort relocated to Richardie’s mission at the mouth of the Detroit River, Anguirot, Orontony,
and their cohort for the most part remained at Sandusky Bay. By 1744 Governor Beauharnois
could report that an uneasy peace had fallen on the Detroit River.35
Richardie played a significant but sometimes subtle and complex role in the relocation
from 1738 to 1743. He was the primary and most prolific conveyor of Wyandot anxieties and
grievances to the French and was trusted by both the tribe and colonial officials to communicate
the goals and intentions of all involved. Yet even at his most earnest he represented the Wyandot
in a way that isolated one of the three major chiefs as a bad moral influence. He undermined the
plans for relocation desired by both the French and the bulk of the Wyandot when he came to
believe it would threaten both their Christian morality and Jesuit spiritual hegemony on the
Detroit River.
Despite Richardie’s significance in this affair, the priest was not a leader in the events
that transpired. He wielded power to influence but never to control their outcome. He likely
projected much more influence on French actions than on the Wyandot ones because of his
control over the information the governor received. His representations of Wyandot petitions,
both honest and deceitful, confused and ultimately paralyzed French officials when his undivided
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support could have made the relocation efforts far more effectual. The French actors,
governmental and religious, typically reacted to initiatives and movements originating from
either the Wyandot or one of their neighbors and could never direct the happenings around
Detroit. The paralysis of the French in turn strained the Wyandot and opened cracks in tribal
unity as anxiety over their safety and future pulled the tribe apart. The priest never controlled the
tribe, but his actions helped to create the context within which they had to act. Undermining
Anguirot created the opportunity for the younger Nicholas Orontony to fill a power gap and
establish both clout and credibility within the tribe. Though Richardie’s efforts to move the
Wyandot to a more remote location on the Detroit River partially succeeded, his actions
contributed to a tribal schism and set the stage for events he could not have anticipated.

KING GEORGE’S WAR AND THE EVE OF CRISIS
While the French blundered about in their negotiations in the pays d’en haut, tensions
with the British escalated into King George’s War in 1744. Though the early fight was confined
to the Atlantic coast, British colonial officials sought to expand their influence by inducting new
member tribes into their Covenant Chain, or the Anglo-Iroquois alliance system. Orontony had
led a delegation from the Sandusky Wyandot to Albany and established a trade relationship with
the British in 1743. Despite these overtures to the British, Orontony and the Sandusky Wyandot
gave no indication they were willing to go to war against the French or permanently break with
their brethren. Richardie, with the aid of a newly arrived Belgian Jesuit named Pierre Potier, still
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ministered to the tribe at the Sandusky settlement and split his time between the Detroit River
and Sandusky Bay.36
Nicholas Orontony took the reins as effective leader at Sandusky and forged a more
formal alliance with the British and Iroquois by 1745. Sandusky hosted the westernmost British
trading house for furs and liquor where Wyandot and British traders travelled freely between
Sandusky Bay, New York, and Pennsylvania. By Orontony’s own words, many of the Wyandot
had become disaffected with the French, resented unequal power balance with the French, and
saw the opportunity for cheaper goods offered by British traders. He outlined this disaffection in
his meeting with the British agent Conrad Weiser in 1748, who wrote:
their coming from the French was because of the hard Usage they received from them;
That they would always get their Young Men to go to War against their Enemies, and
wou’d use them as their own People, that is like Slaves, & their goods were so dear that
they, the Indians, could not buy them.37
The French, with Father Richardie’s aid, took steps of their own to secure an edge in
Native alliances. Together with some allied Mohawks from Kahnawake, the French launched a
devastating raid on the British and Iroquois settlement at Saratoga in November of 1745 as an
exhibition of French might and to dispel British rumors that the French would soon be expelled
from the Great Lakes.38 Richardie prepared a speech for the Wyandot near Sandusky to assure
them that the French would be the winning horse in the coming conflict and that the Wyandot
should beseech their kin to reject the British and stay loyal to France. Longueuil, the Detroit
commandant at this time, depended on Richardie to convey his message for the tribe, as
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Longueuil could not speak Wyandot.39 Richardie translated Longueuil’s message and sent it to
Potier to be delivered near Sandusky with a personal postscript. As much as Richardie clashed
with colonial authority during the relocation affair, he disliked the idea of the Wyandot allying
with Protestant England even more. He affirmed all of Longueuil’s statements and appealed to
their love for the missionary to return to the Detroit River, saying:
My children, all that was said is true. Be his [the governor’s] children again where he is
found. Take courage and return to this country [Detroit], where there are no bad tidings.
Undertake this endeavor that we may see each other again soon, my brothers and sisters
of blood. I love you all with all my heart, without exception, and I salute you.40
The elders responded immediately after hearing this speech, promising that all would
soon return to join the Wyandot of Bois Blanc Island on the Detroit River. They included a
personal response to Richardie himself that they would return to him to the place “where there is
no bad news.” The old priest collapsed from a stroke soon after dispatching Potier, was stricken
by paralysis, and forced to depart for medical treatment to Quebec, leaving the inexperienced
Potier in charge of the mission as tensions swelled in the pays d’en haut. 41
Though Potier ministered briefly to the Wyandot settlement at Lorette prior to his arrival
at Detroit in 1744, he had little direct experience with tribal and colonial negotiations. Potier
spent the winter at or near Sandusky but reported his work slow and ineffective. Potier’s mastery
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of the Wyandot tongue extended only to writing and delivering prepared speeches, stunting his
ability to connect with the tribe.42
Meanwhile, tensions continued to escalate due to King George’s War. The assault on
Saratoga enraged the Iroquois who retaliated and went to war against the French. The Wyandot
at this point had strong ties to the Iroquois, ties strengthened and formalized during Orontony’s
diplomatic overtures in 1745. Fearful that the Wyandot would side with the Iroquois and bring
the fight to Detroit and perhaps doubtful of Potier’s ability to smooth things over, Richardie
penned an address to the tribe from his sickbed. He beseeched the tribe both as a representative
of the French and as their spiritual father, “Again I say obey, my children. Remember the way of
the elders who continually encouraged one another to say: ‘We will be strengthening this country
for a long time when we will attach ourselves to the governor.’”43
Potier was well aware of both the escalating tensions and his own shortcomings in
dealing with them. He appears to have arrived at the novel solution to kill two birds with one
stone by collecting the first ever census of the Detroit and Sandusky Wyandot. Compiling such a
census would have brought Potier into contact with nearly every person in the Wyandot tribe.
Potier would have had ample opportunity to practice the tribal tongue and would familiarize
himself with the tribespersons on a personal, face-to-face level. Because he compiled this census
in the first months of 1747 Potier created a glimpse of the tribe and its dispersal immediately
prior to the breaking point of Orontony’s plan.
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The census reveals that over two thirds of the Wyandot resided, or at least maintained a
residence, on or near Bois Blanc Island. Though they still wintered at Sandusky, the faction that
permanently moved to that area were firmly in the minority. Nicholas Orontony himself
maintained a residence on the Detroit River in the same village as Sastaretsy and Tayetchatin.
Orontony thus had ample opportunity to coordinate with the Anishinaabeg and Miami tribes in
the area and foment discontent with the French among those tribes. It also shows that Anguirot
had very recently died, leaving Orontony as the most prominent voice and undisputed leader in
the pro-British faction of Wyandot.44
Richardie, even from distant Quebec, could see the writing on the wall. He so feared for
Potier’s safety that he tried to have him forbidden from wintering at Sandusky and wrote the
Jesuit superior of New France to enforce this desire. Richardie felt he would be healthy enough
to return to Detroit by the first snowfall and aid in deescalating the tension. Potier, partially
because he wanted to improve his Wyandot and partially from an earnest will to commit to his
post, refused to abandon the mission unless the tribe ordered him away.45

CRISIS AND RESOLUTION
Nicholas Orontony devised a plan to destroy Fort Pontchartrain and expel the French
from the pays d’en haut. The plan seems to have been to assault the Mission of the Assumption
on Bois Blanc Island and either kill or capture Potier. The mission would then have been used as
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a staging ground to assault and capture Detroit. The plan went awry, however, when a few
Wyandot at Sandusky acted too early, killing five Canadian traders from Detroit and ransacking
their wares. A Native woman, either a Miami or Wyandot, travelled to Bois Blanc Island and
tipped off the missionary, who fled to Fort Detroit as Orontony approached. Longueuil put the
post on high alert, first banning all indigenous people from the fort and subsequently prohibiting
them from carrying weapons within or near the fort. Sastaretsy and Tayetchatin disavowed
Orontony’s attack and swore allegiance to the French before departing for Quebec to confirm
their loyalty. Officially disavowed by the two most preeminent leaders of the Wyandot and
unable to carry out his initial plan, Orontony burned the Bois Blanc Island mission to the ground
and fled with a portion of his followers to Sandusky.46
The other tribes of the pays d’en haut began lashing out in the confusion. The Odawa,
Potawatomi, and Ojibwa also killed and robbed several French traders in or near Detroit and
Michilimackinac. The Miami chief Memeskia captured and ransacked the French Fort des
Miami. The British and their Iroquois allies sent agents to foment discontent among the French
allies and broaden the Covenant Chain. Colonial officials saw Orontony as the originator in the
greatest crisis of the French alliance system since the Fox Wars. They saw pacifying the
perceived originators of the conflict as an essential first step to pacifying the region as a whole.47
Longueuil called a council at Fort Pontchartrain in August 1747 to ascertain from the
Wyandot how to pacify the region. Their chief request was that Richardie return to Detroit as
soon as possible to aid in the reconciliation process. Both Sastaretsy and Tayetchatin sickened
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and died from disease contracted during their diplomatic visit to Quebec, meaning that with
Anguirot’s death in early 1747 and Orontony’s flight, the entire upper hierarchy of the Wyandot
tribe evaporated in less than a year. Richardie also had a history of siding with the elders of the
tribe when disputes arose with the younger members, so Richardie’s return would help the elders
consolidate authority both with the French and the younger warriors at a time when clear
leadership was desperately needed. For all his earlier manipulations, the priest was still respected
and influential to the Wyandot. Richardie himself had wanted to return to Detroit almost as soon
as he departed and agreed immediately, departing from Montreal for Detroit on September 10.48
French authorities, pressured by the Atlantic coast campaigns, relied on Richardie to
bring the dissident Wyandot back into the fold as essential to pacifying the frontier. One officer,
Charles Deschamps de Boishébert, wrote to the French minister:
Should affairs not be arranged by Father Richardie, ancient missionary of the Hurons,
who is going to form a new establishment in that country, Canada would be to be pitied;
we should be in need of great assistance from France to support ourselves here.49
Colonial officials did not place all their hopes on Richardie, however. Orontony received visitors
from the Miami, turned away those answering Longueuil’s call for allies, and continued to
entertain British tradesmen at Sandusky with Longueuil unable to take action against him. The
governor sent a convoy of weapons, ammunition, and 150 soldiers to hold down the fort until
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Richardie arrived. If Richardie could not restore the peace, the governor at least hoped the troops
and arms would help Longueuil repel an attack.50
Richardie arrived at Detroit in October with a delegation of French officers, Wyandot
elders, and Kahnawake Mohawks to restore peace to the area. He appealed to the Wyandot with
ecclesiastical language, assuring that all could be forgiven if the tribe abandoned Orontony but
promising excommunication for all who persisted in their rebellion. As even Nicholas Orontony
was a practicing Christian, the language of sin and absolution was an especially powerful
assertion. Orontony reached out for potential reconciliation and visited Bois Blanc Island himself
in November 1747. Richardie was willing to absolve Orontony of his actions and welcome him
back into the fold, even officiating a marriage ceremony between Orontony and a Wyandot
woman on November 19. Orontony’s overtures of reconciliation may have been genuine, but
negotiations had fallen through by March 1748, when the dissident chief burned the village at
Sandusky and retreated inland to be closer to the British. He reaffirmed his ties to the British in a
meeting with Conrad Weiser in Pennsylvania, ending all attempts at negotiation.51
Though Orontony permanently split from the French-Native alliance, Richardie
succeeded in preserving most of the Wyandot as allies at Detroit. He convinced the Frenchaligned Wyandot to relocate to La Pointe-de-Montréal in 1748, directly across the river from
Fort Pontchartrain, and received 5,000 livres from the government to establish a new mission.52
He and Potier left Orontony to his devices, at least pleased that he stayed away from the rest of
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the Wyandot while persisting in his alliance with the British.53 An uneasy silence fell over the
pays d’en haut. Orontony maintained a strong diplomatic and trade relationship with the British,
but the Wyandot headman never took major action against the French.54
Nicholas Orontony died from disease sometime before September 1750, but his followers
remained in exile near the Vermillion River. Richardie endeavored to convince the sundered
branch of the Wyandot tribe to rejoin their kin in the French-Native alliance. He left in early
September of 1750 with a few French porters and Wyandot companions. A flurry of rumor and
fear erupted immediately in the tribe. A group of elders left the mission to intercept Richardie
and turn him back from his mission. An elder named Babi confessed to believe that Orontony
had beseeched the dissident Wyandot to kill any Frenchmen who came to meet them, even the
Black Robes. Their fears convinced Potier and the Detroit commandant to send messages of their
own, begging Richardie to return for fear of his life, but Richardie pressed on and met the
“Nicholites” at a neutral ground a short way from their camp.55
Richardie met remarkable success. The Jesuit wintered among the Wyandot for two
months, competing for their attention with two British tradesmen stationed who warned the
village against committing to the French in order to maintain a trading relationship. The
Wyandot ransacked the British trading outpost, pillaged the supplies, and shipped them to
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Detroit for sale. Richardie convinced several of the elders and young people to depart for Detroit
immediately and extracted promises from the rest to return after winter.56
Richardie went to Detroit in the spring of 1751 alongside most of the Wyandot dissidents.
Not all of Orontony’s followers returned to their kin that year, but the French believed their
kinship bonds would pull them back together quickly. This proved prescient as all of the
dissidents had either returned to Detroit and the French alliance or fled the country to join either
the Iroquois or the Miami by the onset of the French and Indian War in 1754.57
As for Richardie, the priest believed that the first wave of returns in 1751 marked the
completion of his task. He departed Detroit in the summer and retired to Quebec and died there
in 1758. The mission passed to Potier, who ministered to the Wyandot and the newly arrived
French habitants. Potier remained at Detroit until his death in 1781, living at a nexus of colonial
power during the French and Indian War, Pontiac’s War, and most of the American Revolution.
Potier would be a key actor on the contested French, First Nations, and (later) British and
American landscape, carrying forward the lessons learned from observing his predecessor.58

CONCLUSION
Richardie’s long and influential tenure as a missionary among the Wyandot at Detroit
from 1728 to 1751 is representative of the Jesuits’ importance in the eighteenth century pays
d’en haut. His extensive training and facility with Wyandot language and customs made him a
particularly well-qualified and effective envoy for French colonial interests. Moreover, his
personal familiarity with almost every local tribal member made him an skilled negotiator and an
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invaluable source of information for the French. His efforts to evangelize and minister to the
Wyandot were central to his ability to insert himself into Native customs and power structures
and to his attempts to further inject his own spiritual and related colonial objectives.
Yet it is essential to understand the limits of Richardie’s influence in the pays d’en haut.
He was more influence to French leaders than Native ones. He could communicate indigenous
concerns and express grievances to colonial officials, but Wyandot leaders consistently took
matters into their own hands their needs were unmet. Though Richardie convinced dissident
Wyandots to reenter the fold, he could not trump Nicholas Orontony’s influence while the man
still lived. The Wyandot were never pawns subject to orders and requests by the missionary or by
French authority. Richardie may have met different results in the winter of 1750 had Sastaretsy,
Tayetchatin, Anguirot, and Orontony not all died within such a short timeframe.
Still, it is important to emphasize that Richardie and most Jesuits had their own agenda
that often did not align with French colonial aims. He cooperated with the French during the
Orontony crisis from 1747 to 1751, but he actively undermined the governor and his agents
during the relocation affair. He supported French attempts to keep the Wyandot away from
Protestant and British influence, but he scuttled French plans when they interfered with Jesuit
intentions. Richardie and his religious order were, first and foremost, concerned with winning
souls for Roman Catholicism, not with creating subjects for the French king. They jealously
guarded their mission from actions perceived to challenge their spiritual authority. Governor
General Beauharnois astutely noted in a letter to the Minister of Marine that, “It will be easy for
you to see that those Fathers want to have a share in the Government, which is very pernicious
inasmuch as they make the savages act according to their Ideas and their interested views.”59
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CHAPTER 3: JESUIT ADAPTATION AND DECLINE DURING
THE BRITISH REGIME, 1754-1765
INTRODUCTION
Richardie could not have known, but his impact during the Wyandot separation crisis
would prove to be the high watermark of Jesuit influence in the North American interior for the
remainder of the eighteenth century. The tumultuous 1750s would begin a long period of
disruption in the pays d’en haut and in the Jesuit missions around the world. The French, with
Jesuit aid, were able to contain the dire situation with their Native allies by 1751, but the
eruption of hostilities in 1754 with Washington’s attack on Fort Duquesne and the start of the
Seven Years’ War marked the beginning of the end for French power in the west. The British
conquest of Quebec in 1760 and the cession of Louisiana to Spain in 1762 brought an end to
French imperial influence on the North American continent. The consequences and unanswered
questions left by this turnover would later spark Pontiac’s War in 1763 and begin the
accumulation of tensions that flamed into the American Revolution in 1775. On top of these
disruptions, the Jesuit missionaries also experienced an additional crisis when the French Crown
announced the order’s expulsion from all French lands, obliterating their institutional support.1
These important turns of event had major consequences for the Jesuits priests still active
in the hinterlands in the 1750s and 1760s. This section will focus on two priests in particular who
were active in two of the most important sites of French imperial power in North America before
1760 and for Pontiac’s War and British imperial rule afterwards. Father Pierre Potier, now fluent
in the Wyandot tongue, and Father Pierre du Jaunay, the Jesuit missionary to the converted
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Odawa at Michilimackinac who ministered to his converts at nearby L’Arbre Croche. Both of
these priests saw their mission change when the hardships of the Seven Years’ War and their
assigned tribes’ increasing activism diminished their influence in imperial affairs as their
diplomatic power decreased. The conquest and departure of French imperial sponsors saw their
institutional support evaporate entirely while British distrust of the interior French and especially
the black-robed missionaries further removed them from a position of power. Nevertheless, the
Jesuits were keenly aware of their vulnerability in the new order and took measures to preserve
their positions within their frontier communities and even attempted to reclaim their earlier status
as ambassadors for the colonial system. The imperial crisis of Pontiac’s War and the Jesuits’
closeness to the Odawa and Wyandot allowed them to preserve their place despite Britain’s open
hostility to their order. They demonstrated themselves to be of some strategic importance as they
worked alongside British military officials to pacify the belligerent tribes.2
Despite the potential strategic value Jesuit priests stood to offer to the new colonial
regime, British perceptions that they were actively subverting rather than aiding British
imperialism and changing political realities within the Anglo-Native alliance system prevailed.
This, combined with the Jesuit expulsion from Louisiana in 1763 and the dissolution of the order
in the 1770s, brought an end to Jesuit political and diplomatic clout in the pays d’en haut.
Though Potier would remain at Detroit until his death in 1781, the Jesuit presence in the west
changed from missionary activity and diplomacy to a depowered position as parochial for the
French settlers.3
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SEVEN YEARS’ WAR
The Orontony Crisis and King George’s War proved pivotal moments in New France’s
strategy for the pays d’en haut. The violence of the crisis and British inroads into the Ohio River
Valley during the war convinced the French Crown and the New France government to double
down on their commitment to the Franco-Native alliance and to their presence in the west. The
governor commissioned Chaussegros de Léry to visit and renovate the western fortresses and
ordered the construction of new forts at Sandusky, Presque Isle at the mouth of the Detroit River,
and, most famously, Fort Duquesne. The commandants saw their budget for diplomatic gifts and
supplies to the Native tribes increase substantially. This included financially supporting an
expanded Jesuit mission at Detroit to better fund their missionary and diplomatic activities
among the Wyandot in order to more strongly secure the tribe’s ties to France.4
This increased commitment also saw a concerted effort to place French habitants in
settlements like Detroit and Michilimackinac in the pays d’en haut. The colonial government
offered free land and financial support to any families who moved into the western settlements.
Dozens of families moved to the banks of the Detroit River to take advantage of this opportunity
and settled primarily on the southeastern shore near Potier’s Jesuit mission. Rather than trek
across the river every Sunday to attend church at Fort Detroit, the newcomers instead opted to
worship at the mission house alongside the Wyandot converts. French and Wyandot worshiped
side by side with Potier combining his traditional role as missionary with his new role as a pastor
to the French newcomers. Potier endeared himself to these new arrivals, making him an
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influential leader within the French community at Detroit that considered him a “saint on
Earth.”5
Potier’s growing prominence with the French came corresponded to a decline in his
influence among the Wyandot. The swell of French settlers into indigenous territory brought
with it the traditional problems of frontier colonization. The Wyandot complained that the
settlers sometimes staked their claim to land that the tribe had not formally donated to the
French.6 Though Potier attained a stronger command of the Wyandot language, the Wyandot
nevertheless began to employ the services of a new translator, one St. Martin. No evidence
suggests Wyandot hostility to the priest himself, but Potier’s new responsibilities to the swell of
French settlers, in addition to the new tensions the settlers brought with them, contributed to a
decline in trust between the French and the Wyandot that saw them less willing to use Potier as a
go-between.7
These tensions accompanied an even bigger shift in Wyandot politics as the Seven Years’
War took its course. With his death in 1747, Sastaretsy’s title was passed down to a successor of
a decidedly less French-exclusive foreign policy. The faction within the Wyandot desirous of a
stronger alliance with the Iroquois reemerged after its brief submersion following Orontony’s
death. The new Sastaretsy chose to reinforce Wyandot bonds to the Anglo-Iroquois Covenant
Chain that Nicholas Orontony had formalized in his dealings with the British. The French called
a council at Detroit in January 1754 as the competition for the Ohio River Valley sharply
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escalated tensions. Not only did the Wyandot refuse to affirm their support for a French war
effort, they also tipped off the Iroquois that the Odawa and the other Anishinaabeg were
amassing for war.8
Nonetheless, French officials managed to secure some level of support from the Detroit
tribes until the later years of the war as French supply shortages strengthened Sastaretsy’s
rhetoric. A Wyandot-hosted Seneca observed a council at Detroit whereby the French
commandant had managed to gather support for a raid against the British. Sastaretsy, however,
vehemently refused to entertain this agenda and shouted the other tribes down, saying:
I am surprised at your Conduct & Readiness to take up the French Hatchet, without
considering the Consequence, especially as I gave you a Caution, before we entered the
Fort or Council Room of the French. He then added. How can I, who am the Flesh and
Blood of the Six Nations and in whose Towns Numbers of our Friends & Children are
living and settled, declare War against them. Where are there any of the Nations now
present, that are not allied to the Six Nations also. To take up the Hatchet against them,
wou'd in my Opinion be wrong.9
Observers testified that Sastaretsy was so persuasive that he silenced the French rallying cry at
that meeting and convinced the Detroit tribes to stand down for the time being. The French
continued to call the Detroit tribes to arms again in early 1759 and, though some eventually
joined the French during the siege of Fort Niagara, the Wyandot in particular were noted to wish
to remain “tranquil on their mats.”10
Nicholas Orontony’s actions in 1747 demonstrated the potential influence the Wyandot
could wield on the Franco-Native alliance. This influence would only grow as the French and
Indian War progressed. The Odawa had long reigned as France’s most powerful ally in the pays
d’en haut, but the Wyandot became ascendant in the 1750s as demonstrated by the effectiveness
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of Sastaretsy’s speech and his insistence on neutrality. The Wyandot alone among the Frenchaligned communities of the pays d’en haut possessed a strong political and kinship connection to
the Iroquois and became a powerful voice for neutrality during the war. This voice became more
and more convincing as the British blockade and supply shortages dried up the flow of French
gifts that fueled their alliance. The acute supply shortages rendered the Wyandot and even the
Odawa eager for the conflict to end and for trade to be reestablished through the British.11
With growth in Wyandot power also came a renewal of internal division. Many Wyandot
opposed strong ties to the Iroquois and the British, instead opting for exclusive ties to their longstanding allies, the French. Though the tribe generally trended towards neutrality during the war,
the pro-French faction was powerful enough to send warriors to fight for the French in the later
stages of the war despite the nadir of the French supply flow. Pro-French Wyandot fought during
the siege of Fort Niagara in 1759, losing warriors to the violence and deepening the bitterness
many of them felt toward the Anglo-Iroquois Covenant Chain. Though this internal tension did
not manifest as a split as it had during the Orontony Crisis, rising internal disagreement
accompanied the rising Wyandot influence and the turbulent political situation in the pays d’en
haut. Many of the Wyandot reestablished themselves once again at Sandusky both to provide a
permanent location near the new French fort and to network with tribes like the Delaware and
Shawnee as well as to more easily receive visits from the Iroquois.12
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While the internal conflict during Richardie’s tenure created opportunities for the old
priest to influence the tribe, the stronger emphasis on Wyandot neutrality and a heightened
position of power among the pays d’en haut communities diminished Potier’s power within the
tribe. The Wyandot no longer needed a direct line to the French colonial power structure in the
form of a Jesuit priest. They now communicated through their translator, St. Martin, or directly
with the commandant at Fort Sandusky if they had demands for the French. The pro-British
Wyandot so insisted on retaining St. Martin’s services that they extracted a promise from the
British detachment sent to claim Detroit after the conquest over two weeks before they were due
to arrive. They could now assert themselves to the other tribes without relying upon the French
and had less need for French clout as they grew closer to the British and Iroquois and adopted
neutrality. Potier’s influence continued to diminish as his financial support from New France
decreased because of the financial strain of the war. Nevertheless, Potier remained a prominent
member of the Wyandot community at Detroit and Sandusky in his capacity as their missionary.
Ties to the British and distance from the French did not diminish their fervor for the Catholic
faith. Conversion to Catholicism appears to have been close to total by 1760 and the Wyandot
continued to embrace Potier as a pastor even as their diplomatic activism meant they no longer
had use for him as a diplomat.13

THE NEW ORDER: 1760-1763
With the fall of Montreal in 1760, the Seven Years’ War came to its conclusion. With
that conclusion came the immediate withdrawal of the French imperial presence from Quebec

13

George Croghan, “Croghan’s Journal, 1754,” in Early Western Travels 1: 121.

44
and the pays d’en haut and its eventual withdrawal from French Louisiana. The peace and
transfer of power was discussed and handled exclusively between the French and the British. No
representatives from indigenous communities took part in the transfer even though they were an
important topic of discussion. The French Crown recognized the conquest of New France by the
British and withdrew from the pays d’en haut, but their Native allies had not been conquered.14
French military officials at Detroit tried to ensure a smooth transfer of power when it
came time for them to depart. Commandant Belestre, a French-Canadian born at Detroit and its
final French commander, held a council with the Wyandot, Odawa, Ojibwa, and Potawatomi
tribes a few days before Colonel Robert Rogers would claim Fort Detroit for the British. Belestre
informed the tribes of his orders from Governor Vaudreuil to turn Detroit over to the British
peacefully. The French settlers had been guaranteed their property and their right to practice their
Catholic faith. He told the tribes that the British had promised to take over from their French
father and attend to them as well and faithfully as the French had before them. But even Belestre
did not believe that the British would deal evenly with the Natives. He departed Detroit with his
French soldiers in December 1760, ashamed to abandon his home and his longtime allies.15
Potier’s future was even less certain than that of the interior French or the Wyandot. The
departure of the French meant that the financial support that had fallen to a trickle during the war
would now be suspended indefinitely. Protestant Britain would certainly never have funded a
Catholic mission in conquered New France. More than that, the British government hated the
Jesuits more than perhaps any other entity in North America, seeing them as the manifestation of
all their problems in the continental interior. They believed the French, and especially the Jesuits,
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to be at the heart of every hostile inclination directed at the British. The interior French, they
believed, continually roused Native warriors to raid the interior and thwart Britain’s colonial
ambitions. Reflecting on the challenges of his early years as Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Sir
William Johnson saw in the Jesuits a symbol for all difficulties for British expansion, writing:
The French in order to reconcile them to these encroachments, loaded them with favours,
and employed the most intelligent Agents, of good influence, as well as artful Jesuits
amongst the several Western and other Nations, who by degrees, prevailed on them to
admit of Forts, under the Notion of Trading houses in their Country, and knowing, that
these posts, could never be maintained contrary to the inclinations of the Indians, they
supplied them thereat with Ammunition and other necessaries in abundance, as also
called them to frequent Congresses, and dismissed them with handsome presents.16
British officials were incapable of believing that the Natives could raise the hatchet
against the British without some puppet master pulling the strings. Though they universally
distrusted the French habitants, their antipathy towards the Jesuits was special. No European,
French or British, had managed to insert themselves more fully into indigenous communities
than the Jesuits. They had lived and worked among the Natives for over a century and had
succeeded, in many cases, in ensuring that the tribes who embraced Catholicism would stay
strongly attached to the French.17
British missionaries rarely approached Jesuit missionary success in winning converts and
imperial allies. The British, as did many of the Native tribes, understood that Jesuits had
represented a commitment to ally militarily and politically with the French and against the
British.18 British colonial officials constantly complained of the vexatious Black Robes rousing
the interior against them. This reputation as Indian rabble-rousers even became a motivation to
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ramp up colonization for some in order to combat their influence. One pamphlet entitled “The
Expediency of Securing Our American Colonies” summarized the overall attitude of the British
Empire towards the Jesuit missionaries with the following statement:
These unjustifiable proceedings afford very plausible arguments to the French Jesuits and
Priests, who, like Satan, whose creatures they are, love to fish in muddy waters, and are
ever rambling in these parts, — to create jealousies and suspicions; widen breaches
however occasioned; inflame the revengeful spirits of these cruel savages, whom they
still abuse; and in short, to persuade them, that our design is, to expel all the natives, and
take possession of the whole country: A notion, with which they seem to have been
strongly impressed of late; but by whom, is no mystery.19
For many British officials, the first order of business after conquering New France was to
expel all French settlers, fur traders, and especially the Jesuits from the interior. They believed
that control of the west could not be secured unless these dangerous subversives were removed
immediately. Therefore, the new regime held little promise of friendliness for the Black Robes.
Anxiety over their vulnerability in the face of institutional hostility motivated Potier and Du
Jaunay in the years of conflicts and crises to come to prove their worth to British colonial
officials and thus prevent their expulsion.20
At first, the fear of expulsion compelled some Jesuits to flee to Upper Louisiana into
French-held territory. This included Potier and the other Jesuit stationed at Detroit, Jean-Baptiste
Salleneuve, and Jean-Baptiste de la Morinie, the missionary to the Potawatomi at St. Joseph.
Salleneuve and Morinie never returned to their posts, but Potier, either from a sense of obligation
to his charges or prescient awareness of the international situation of the Jesuit order, returned to
Detroit before September of 1761 and was received “amid the greatest manifestations of joy by
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his friends and with utmost humanity by the British General.” 21 Potier’s return from exile proved
incredibly fortuitous when the Superior Council of Louisiana decreed the Jesuit order to be
dissolved on July 9, 1763. All the Jesuits in Upper Louisiana, including Salleneuve and Morinie,
were seized and expelled from the colony with only the clothes on their backs and a few books.
Britain did not dissolve the Jesuit order in Canada until the order’s global dissolution by papal
decree in 1773. Thus, Potier and Du Jaunay, the last remaining Jesuits in the pays d’en haut,
were left with allegiance to the regime as their only option.22
Because the British recognized Detroit’s strategic importance, they made the fort the
command center for the entire pays d’en haut alliance system. Sir William Johnson, the British
Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the northern colonies, paid a visit Detroit in September of
1761 to smooth over some of the tensions that had arisen in the west. The regime change had left
many of the tribes in doubt as to their status and to how the new alliance system would function.
The indigenous communities were eager for a resumption of trade and for the flow of gifts that
had been disrupted by the Seven Years’ War. Some felt threatened by the new order, with tribes
like the Ojibwe of Michilimackinac and the Odawa at Detroit losing the favorable status they had
enjoyed with the French regime. These tribes especially resented the British efforts to humble the
tribes and relegate them to a submissive position. Others saw this new order as an opportunity to
advance themselves in the new imperial context.23
The Wyandot tribe split between Detroit and Sandusky found itself in a better position
than any other outside the Iroquois Confederacy to take advantage of the new regime. Though a
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portion of the tribe remained firmly anti-British and anti-Iroquois, the prominence and power of
the pro-Covenant Chain faction and the tribe’s kinship ties to the Iroquois allowed them to
position themselves as the intermediary between the Anglo-Iroquois Covenant Chain and the
former French-allied tribes of the pays d’en haut. The British even recognized the Wyandot as
the head of the Detroit River confederacy of tribes and communicated both their potential as
British allies and the danger they posed as an influential enemy. Other sources saw the Wyandot
as strong allies who were well-disposed to the British and effective intermediaries.24
Sir William Johnson’s visit to Detroit in September 1761 testifies to the intricacies of the
Wyandot position in the pays d’en haut and Potier’s new position within the alliance system.
Immediately after his arrival at Detroit, fifty Wyandot women and two headmen greeted Johnson
and gifted him with corn and other food goods. Johnson held a conference with all the tribes of
the western Great Lakes, including the Wyandot from Detroit and Sandusky, to address their
grievances with the new system, assure them of his respect, and grease the wheels of alliance
with a multitude of gifts. Many Wyandot, already well-disposed to the British and the Iroquois,
received him happily, but tensions persisted with others. A fight nearly broke out between the
Wyandot and the Seneca present at the conference and only Johnson’s mediation and liberal
distribution of gifts prevented an altercation. Ultimately, Johnson parted ways with the Wyandot
on good terms, but the tensions present at the meeting did not dissipate.25
While Richardie had been central to councils and conferences like this under the French
regime both as a participant and a translator, Potier did not play an active part in the negotiation.

24

Sir William Johnson, “Enumeration of Indians Within the Northern Department,” Johnson
Hall, 18 November 1763, NYCD 7: 583; Jon Parmenter, "Pontiac's War: Forging New Links in
the Anglo-Iroquois Covenant Chain, 1758-1766," Ethnohistory 44, no. 4 (1997): 624-625;
Sturtevant, “Jealous Neighbors,” 269.
25
Sir William Johnson, “1761: Conference at Detroit,” WHC 18: 234-237, 240-241, 245.

49
Due to both the British distrust of Jesuits and because Wyandot ascendancy had cut out the need
for a middleman in the form of a missionary, Potier was relegated to the sidelines in this affair.
Johnson hired St. Martin for interpretation rather than rely on Potier, who is not recorded as
having participated at all. Potier did manage to secure some face time with Johnson, however, by
inviting the man to dine with him at the mission. Johnson was charmed enough by the Jesuit to
personally invite him to a ball for the well-to-do habitants and French traders.26 He also made
sure to visit and dine with Potier whenever he visited the Wyandot village to meet with the
Wyandot chiefs. Whether or not Potier offered any counsel on dealing with the Wyandot is not
recorded, but Johnson ended his visit convinced of the “favorable disposition” of the habitants
and the Jesuit despite his earlier conviction of the untrustworthiness of both parties.27
The tense situation in the pays d’en haut seemed to have stabilized after Johnson’s visit,
but tribal anger reignited in 1762 when Henry Gladwin took over as the commandant of Detroit.
Gladwin, much like the Governor-General, Jeffrey Amherst, held a very low opinion of the
indigenous peoples. He resented Britain’s inability to conquer the tribes and made it clear in his
dealings with them that he believed them inferior and foolishly arrogant for thinking otherwise.
He, as did other commandants at Amherst’s behest, stopped the flow of gifts the tribes believed
were the bare minimum of an alliance. He refused to lower the prices on trade goods to the
competitive levels the British had earlier promised to the tribes. Worse still, his interactions with
the Detroit tribes were contemptuous at best, as he disdained of all Natives and strove to
subjugate the tribes through British rule rather than alliance. In one famous example, he
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publically executed an enslaved Native man in order to send a message to all Natives to fall in
line with British rule or else suffer the consequences.28
A similar pattern emerged throughout the Great Lakes region as tension rose between the
tribes and the British. The Shawnee, Mingo, and Delaware resented both British rule and their
own vassalage to the Iroquois. They felt threatened by the influx of British settlers in
Pennsylvania and near the Ohio River who squatted on Native land and disrupted their
communities through the sale of destructive alcohol. The Odawa and Potawatomi of Detroit and
the Ojibwe of Michilimackinac resented the British for their heavy-handedness and feared that
they would be reduced to thralldom under a British yoke. A Delaware spiritual leader, Neolin,
preached of a Native America unified against the encroaching British and called for all Native
tribes to cast out the invading Europeans or else meet their doom.29
Even the Wyandot, who had tipped off the British about a potential attack from the
Seneca in 1761, could no longer suppress their animosity towards the British and began to rail
against their abuses. Sandusky especially became a hotbed for Wyandot discontent, who
complained to the commandant of the nearby fort that he “used them to[o] severe and bought
their Land up.”30 Ironically, considering his earlier pro-British stance, Sastaretsy and his
lieutenant, Takay, were the loudest among the Wyandot who came to oppose the British. The
two other phatry chiefs, Babi and Téata, pushed for neutrality in the face of these tensions, but
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neutrality became a less viable option with each passing day as Pontiac, an Odawa chief at
Detroit, began to rally the tribes towards war.31
Du Jaunay and Potier opposed any clash with the British and tried to smooth over
tensions and aid the British before the war broke out. Du Jaunay wrote often to Gladwin at
Detroit to inform him of the discontent of the Ojibwe at Michilimackinac.32 However, their
advice went unheeded by colonial officials at least in part because of their innate distrust of the
Jesuits. The Fort Sandusky commandant dismissed Wyandot complaints in 1762 as the “Lies of
the old Pri[e]sts.”33 Their distrust was certainly not without merit. Father Richardie had rallied
the Wyandot at Sandusky into ransacking the wares of nearby British traders a mere ten years
before. The Jesuits by 1762 had far more to lose by opposing the British than by assisting them,
but two years as allies could not erase the suspicion born from over 150 years of direct
opposition.

JESUIT DIPLOMACY AND THE SIEGE OF DETROIT, 1763
In 1763, the Odawa chief Pontiac managed to unite thousands of Native men and women
in the colonial west to take up the hatchet against the British in the hopes of restoring the French
presence on the river. The Odawa, Potawatomi, and Chippewa of Detroit and the Ojibwe from
Michilimackinac took up arms under his direct command while the Mingo, Delaware, Shawnee,
and the Seneca of Pennsylvania and the Ohio River Valley lashed out under the spiritual
influence of Neolin. Though none of the pays d’en haut tribes took up arms against Pontiac, two
specific groups offered notable resistance to Pontiac’s War. The Odawa of Michilimackinac and
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L’Arbre Croche never aided Pontiac, and the Wyandot of Detroit and Sandusky, whose support
was either brief or mixed, had their own compelling reasons for opposing the war. It is no
accident, however, that these two were the only remaining groups who hosted a Jesuit
missionary. Du Jaunay and Potier both used the war as an opportunity to resume their earlier role
as imperial diplomats and emissaries with notable success.
The pays d’en haut erupted on May 7, 1763 when Pontiac and his allies attempted to
capture Fort Detroit. Colonel Gladwin was tipped off to the plot and what would have been a
sack instead became a protracted siege. Pontiac’s efforts enlisted all the Detroit tribes and about
half of the Wyandot. Much as the Orontony affair had done over a decade earlier, the plan to take
Detroit split the Wyandot into two factions. One part, led by Sastaretsy and Takay, took part in
the initial attack with the. Sastaretsy himself played an important role in rallying the other tribes
into action with the Onondaga and Oneida counting him among “the first disturbers of the
peace.”34 The Wyandot at Sandusky chose to align primarily with Sastaretsy and attacked the
British Fort Sandusky, killing all of its inhabitants except for the commandant, who they took
captive. Another part, led by the elders Babi and Theata, refused to answer the initial call.35
Catholicism majorly affected Wyandot behavior during the siege, even among the
Pontiac-aligned Wyandot. The anti-war faction even refused to take part in any war until the
Catholic feast day of the Ascension on May 12 had passed. Pontiac, however, refused to take no
for an answer and continually pressured the neutral Wyandot to take part in the siege. The
faction finally answered his call after Potier’s Ascension Day Mass, but their aid was half-

34

“The Onondaga and Oneida Indians: Speech to Col. Henry Bouquet,” 2 October 1764,
Bouquet Papers 6: 653.
35
Navarre, “Pontiac Manuscript,” 6; Colhoun, Fort Pitt, 1 June 1763, Bouquet Papers 6: 197.

53
hearted at best. Only fifty warriors from the Wyandot took part in a siege comprised of 875
warriors.36
Potier became the loudest voice for peace outside of the besieged Fort Detroit. Pontiac
and his allies had left him and most of the French habitants unmolested, but many French settlers
outside the fort refused to aid him either directly or indirectly. Most of the French doubtless
wished to simply be left alone and away from war, but Potier had additional motivation to pursue
an end to the fighting. Potier understood that blame would fall immediately upon the French
especially the Jesuits as the instigators of the attacks, even though they had nothing to gain from
expelling the British and restoring French imperial presence. France had dissolved its branch of
the Jesuit order, stripped them of their property, and expelled them from French lands. Two of
Potier’s close friends, Salleneuve and Morinie, had been expelled as a result and Potier could not
expect his situation to improve if the French returned. The British Empire was no friend to the
Jesuit order, but the imperial regime in Quebec had refrained from dissolving the order unlike the
French in Louisiana. Potier’s only hope to remain with his mission was for the British to retain
their presence on the Detroit River. But Potier also needed to send a clear message to the British
that he was an asset rather than a liability. To that end, Potier and his compatriot at
Michilimackinac actively collaborated with British imperial authorities to absolve themselves of
suspicion and to restore peace as quickly as possible.37
Potier gave a speech on May 14 to both the French habitants and Wyandot attending his
mission that he would deny the holy sacrament to anyone who further aided Pontiac’s War,
effectively excommunicating the pro-war faction as his predecessor Richardie had during the
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Orontony crisis.38 The anti-war faction of the Wyandot had been loathe to participate from the
beginning and would later claim to have only participated under duress. Babi and Theata’s
faction believed it still had much to gain in allying with the British rather than opposing them
like Sastaretsy and Takay’s group. The Wyandot had become the de facto representatives of the
Detroit tribes under British rule. Potier’s declaration capitalized on their already-present feelings
of discontent with the role forced upon them by their pro-war kin and Pontiac’s confederacy. On
May 16, two days after Potier’s ultimatum, the majority of the Wyandot withdrew their support
and joined Potier in calling for peace. Considering the Wyandot were so devotedly Catholic that
they had refused to partake in the war before a special feast day, Potier’s declaration would have
certainly influenced their timely decision to withdraw. The anti-war Wyandot sent a delegation
to Detroit on May 22 to assert that they had only participated in the war due to Pontiac’s
coercion and returned some captives as a show of good faith. Not all Wyandot stood down after
Potier’s ultimatum, however, and a large portion of the tribe aligned with Pontiac through the
rest of the year.39
Potier became a leader among the Detroit French in addition to his prominent place
within the Wyandot tribe and brought this clout to bear in an attempt to prove his loyalty and
bring about peace. On May 14, the same day he excommunicated the pro-war faction, Potier
organized a delegation of French habitants on the south side of the river to beseech Pontiac to
end the war. Like Potier, the French settlers understood that they were under suspicion from the
British for instigating the conflict. The war itself was also dangerous and disruptive for their
lives even if Pontiac never targeted the French due in part to him forcing the French to supply
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him throughout the siege. Fearing for their future motivated Potier and his delegation to sue for
peace to prove that they had a place in the British west. This first delegation met little success,
but Potier persisted throughout June and July to petition for an end to the war.40
Meanwhile, the Ojibwe of Michilimackinac had chosen to support Pontiac. The Ojibwe
took the fort by surprise on June 2, killing or capturing almost all of the soldiers and British
traders and ransacking their wares and magazines for supplies. The Kiskakon Odawa, much like
the Wyandot, had embraced Catholicism thanks to the efforts of the Jesuits stationed at the
longstanding mission of St. Ignace. The Kiskakon Odawa were more numerous and independent
than the Wyandot and resisted all coercion to take part in Pontiac’s plan. Because this branch of
the Odawa refused to participate from the beginning, Du Jaunay took a different route to prove
his worth to the British Empire. While Detroit’s social and political power centered on the
military post at the fort, Michilimackinac’s social and political center rested in its Catholic
church. Michilimackinac’s St. Anne’s Church, according to Keith Widder, “functioned like the
hub of a wheel whose spokes fanned out across the pays d’en haut,” and the old Jesuit wielded
political power as its pastor. Du Jaunay’s influence derived from his close relationship with the
Odawa, his ability to represent their interests before the British, and his personal bravery and
initiative to take action.41
When the Ojibwe broke into Fort Michilimackinac, Du Jaunay offered refuge to a dozen
soldiers, including the commander, Captain George Etherington, preventing their capture and
ultimately saving their lives. He sheltered them in his house within the fort until the fighting
ended, then spirited them away to the Odawa at nearby L’Arbre Croche with aid from a
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prominent French fur trader and soldier allied with the British named Charles Langlade. The
Kiskakon Odawa, who had not been notified of a forthcoming attack, were outraged at their
Ojibwe neighbors and offered shelter to the surviving British soldiers. The local Odawa chief,
Bindanowan, and Etherington dispatched Du Jaunay alongside Langlade and the chief’s son,
Kinonchamek, to inform Detroit of the fall of Michilimackinac, assure Gladwin of the Kiskakon
Odawa’s allegiance, and to demand answers from Pontiac. Etherington was convinced that Du
Jaunay would be essential for peace talks and vouched for the priest while begging Gladwin to
send him back as soon as possible.42
Du Jaunay’s actions at Detroit demonstrate his two-fold role as both an emissary for the
British and an ambassador to Pontiac. Gladwin received the delegation from Michilimackinac
and trusted him enough to give him a war belt to give to the Ojibwe. This war belt held special
symbolic importance in Euro-Native diplomacy as a physical representation of alliance. Du
Jaunay did not depart immediately, however, as he had received a different set of tasks from
Bindanowan to hold council with Pontiac. Pontiac agreed to the council where Du Jaunay
pleaded for the future safety of British captives from Michilimackinac. Du Jaunay also relayed
Bindanowan’s outrage at Pontiac’s actions and his demand for an explanation. Pontiac responded
only by sending a ritual war hatchet with Du Jaunay to the Kiskakon Odawa, demanding they
join in the rebellion. Du Jaunay returned to Michilimackinac as an emissary both to the Ojibwe
and the British, as Gladwin tasked him with carrying a wampum belt to the Ojibwe to reaffirm
their good faith with the British. Bindanowan accepted the gesture from Gladwin, but rejected
that of Pontiac and threw his hatchet away.43
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Meanwhile, dissension among the Wyandot began to undermine Pontiac’s attempts to
cast out the British. Pontiac dispatched the Wyandot and the Potawatomi to capture the British
fort at Presque Isle at the mouth of the Detroit River. Rather than kill the garrison, however, the
Wyandot captured most of the soldiers and returned them to their village at Detroit. Dissent
between pro-war and neutral Wyandot became acute when Pontiac-allied Wyandot killed two of
the prisoners while the rest were released to take refuge in Fort Detroit.44
Potier’s endeavors for a peaceful end to the conflict continued into July. He organized at
least two more delegations of prominent habitants to petition Pontiac and kept an open line of
communication with Fort Detroit despite the siege. Potier learned of another planned attack on
Detroit Pontiac for July 5 and made ready to cross the river to inform the fort. Pontiac had had
enough of the priest and the French’s unwillingness to lend him aid and threatened to destroy the
mission and kill Potier if he continued to aid the fort. Potier did not remain cowed for long,
however, and managed to send word to the fort on July 17 of another attack.45

“RESOLUTIONS”
Pontiac’s siege continued to deteriorate through the summer and early autumn of 1763.
The neutral Wyandot had abandoned the siege near the start, but the pro-war Wyandot finally
departed shortly after the attack on Presque Isle. The remaining besieging tribes began to fall
away as well until October 31, when Pontiac himself withdrew to the Maumee River to continue
his war deep within the hinterlands. Pontiac’s withdrawal brought an end to the most intense
stage of the war in the west.
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Peace talks began in late 1763 and the Wyandot were among the first to come to terms.
Though the Detroit Wyandot had established a formal peace in 1763, many of the pro-war
Wyandot, including Sastaretsy and Takay, had fled to Sandusky and continued to fight in near
Fort Pitt alongside the Mingo, Delaware, and Shawnee. Colonel Henry Bouquet dealt a serious
military defeat to these tribes in 1763 at the Battle of Bushy Run, but the defeat had merely
halted the Native offensive. The British military’s best efforts could not bring a decisive end to
the conflict.46
The Sandusky Wyandot and the rest of the belligerent tribes came to terms during
Colonel John Bradstreet’s 1764 expedition into the west. A delegation commissioned by
“Sastaregi of the Hurons” that represented the Wyandot, Shawnee, Delaware, and Mingo met
with Bradstreet after the colonel marched into the Ohio River Valley at the head of a large
detachment of British soldiers. Bradstreet offered generous terms as he had with other belligerent
tribes and, in exchange for the release of all British prisoners, promised to cease hostilities.
Nevertheless, the Wyandot so feared retaliation and subjugation that they sent their terms of
acquiescence during William Johnson’s final peace council through a messenger rather than risk
attending the conference. The compliance of the Detroit Wyandot, however, still benefitted their
kin. The Wyandot returned to the prominent position they had held on the Detroit River before
1763. They assisted in bringing the Detroit Odawa to terms with the British and resumed their
position as the spokespeople for the tribes of Detroit.47
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The end of 1763 also marked a firm end to the influence of the Jesuits in imperial affairs.
Though the British refrained from holding the French legally responsible for Pontiac’s War,
British officers and agents persisted in the belief that the interior French were the true instigators
of the conflict. George Croghan, a prominent tradesman and an agent of Britain’s Bureau of
Indian Affairs, remarked, “In the last Indian war the most part of the French were concerned in it
… they have, therefor, great reason to be thankful to the British clemency in not bringing them to
deserved punishment.” The British continued to view the Jesuits as the symbol of their inability
to control the interior and as masterminds sparking insurrection in the “lazy, idle people” and the
indigenous communities. The Jesuits’ actions during the war could not overwrite the pre-war
prejudices of those officers they had aided.48
Sir William Johnson believed expelling the Jesuits would aid the British empire in more
ways than disposing of a subversive presence. Writing in January 1764, Johnson expressed:
After all that can be said, we shall be liable to many Broils, till the French Inhabitants and
Jesuits are removed, the latter (being no longer a society in France) we might very well
appropriate their Lands to his Majesty’s Use. I dare fay they would be sufficient to endow
a Bishoprick in Canada, and for good Missionaries, and I imagine an Episcopal
Foundation in that Country would greatly Contribute to bring over the French, and make
good Subjects of them in Time.49
Also subscribing to the belief that Britain could never control the interior while it maintained a
French population, Johnson saw an opportunity in Jesuit expulsion to further consolidate British
control. Taking inspiration from the Catholic missionaries he despised, Johnson planned to
deploy similarly trained British missionaries to replicate the attachment some indigenous
communities felt for the Jesuits in order to further wed them to British rule.
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Part of the peace terms for the Michilimackinac Ojibwe were to consent to the removal of
all French fur traders and Jesuit missionaries from the fort, to which the Ojibwe consented. The
Kiskakon Odawa, however, did not consent to the removal of their trusted missionary. They had
fallen under suspicion despite never having aided Pontiac and had to argue their case before Sir
William Johnson. Chief Bindanowan affirmed both his and Du Jaunay’s friendship to the British
during the war, saying:
I only heard a little bird Whistle an Acct of it & on going to Michilimackinac I found
your people killed. Upon w[hi]ch I sent our Priest to inquire into the Cause of it. On the
Priests return he bro[ugh]t me no favorable acc[oun]t, but a War hatchet from Pondiac
w[hi]ch I scarcely looked on, & imediately threw away.50
Despite these affirmations and the significant aid that Du Jaunay and the French had given to the
British during the war, British high command under General Thomas Gage ordered that all
French traders, settlers, and missionaries be removed from Michilimackinac. The commandant,
holding a better understanding of the situation at Michilimackinac, saw no reason to comply with
this and belayed the order. The French were allowed to remain at Michilimackinac, but their
numbers remained too small for a tithe to support Du Jaunay’s mission. The old Jesuit retired to
Quebec in 1765.51
Though Potier had tried to reinsert himself in the imperial system as an ambassador
during Pontiac’s War, the missionary never managed to reclaim the position he had under the
French. Unlike Du Jaunay, Potier was allowed to remain at his post. His saving grace likely
came from his attachment to the Wyandot, who were, to the British, “remarkable for their good
sense and hospitality” with, “a particular attachment to the Roman Catholic religion, the French,
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by their priests, having taken uncommon pains to instruct them.”52 Theata and a delegation of
elders personally requested that Potier be allowed to remain among them during council on April
29, 1764. Potier was allowed to remain the Wyandot missionary as he had under the French, but
no effort was made to fund his mission.53
Potier relied on tithing his Wyandot and French parishioners to fund the mission, but still
found himself unable to cope with the costs. The war had left the Wyandot with few trade goods
to help fund the mission, so they deeded a portion of their land to the mission. Potier, lacking the
laborers needed to till the soil, sold the land to a French habitant. The Catholic bishop of Quebec
provided a more lasting solution to support Potier’s missionary efforts. He established a parish
on the southeast shore of the Detroit River to join the parish on the northwest shore adjoining the
fort. Naming it the Parish of the Assumption and appointing Potier the pastor, the archdiocese of
Quebec began to support the mission financially to prevent its closure. Potier never truly escaped
financial hardship, but the additional support from the bishop and his appointment as a parish
priest allowed him to continue his practice even after the international dissolution of the Jesuit
order in 1773.54
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CONCLUSION
The Society of Jesus and its black-robed missionaries rank among the most important and
influential figures in early North American history. They spearheaded New France’s expansion
by forging strong and lasting relationships with powerful indigenous communities. Their zeal for
spreading their version of Roman Catholicism to indigenous communities pushed them deep into
the interior and pushed them to contact peoples with which no other European had interacted.
Perhaps alone of all the Europeans who chose to relocate to North America in the seventeenth
century, the Jesuits could not count the possibility of material gain as one of their motivations.
Many of the Black Robes crossed the Atlantic in the hopes of meeting a violent end and so
receive an eternal reward as a martyr of the Christian religion. In this regard, at least, many
found success.1
The Jesuit legacy in early North America is complicated, to say the least. In pushing
deeper and further than most Europeans and through their sustained contact with the indigenous
peoples of North America, they undoubtedly and unintentionally exacerbated the spread of
infectious diseases that killed so many thousands of Native people. Their push for certain Native
tribes to ally with New France involved them in the continental wars of European empires. Their
constant drive to evangelize North America had them press for the dissolution and rejection of
centuries-old Native traditions and spiritualties, though in this they found relatively little
success.2
Historical narratives of New France tend to shift away from the Jesuit priests after the
1660s as the French colonial project intensified and expanded, but the Jesuits occupied an
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important place in the new phase of colonialism as they had of old. The missionaries had enjoyed
a near monopoly of access to the indigenous communities of North America before Louis XIV
converted New France into a royal colony. The Jesuits then contended with an imperial vision
that often clashed with their own but could not dispense of their services or their expertise.
Rather than limit themselves to decrying the liquor trade, spreading Catholicism, or regulating
sexual interactions between Europeans and Natives, the Jesuits threw themselves into the
transforming imperial enterprise of the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. They
adapted their previous methods of interacting with the indigenous communities to become
powerful and influential diplomats who could often direct the course of intercultural discourse,
interactions, and politics. In theory, they advised and aided their assigned indigenous
communities while pushing the French colonial agenda. In practice, they maintained their own
agenda based on what they saw as their overriding missionary obligations. They subverted or
complicated relations between French and Natives if they felt their vision threatened, jealously
defending their access to the tribes and limiting the access of parties they considered
undesirable.3
The pressures of rising imperial tensions during King George’s War and the Seven
Years’ War led many of the tribes to which the Jesuits were assigned to adopt a more direct
approach when dealing with European colonial empires. They began to eschew the use of the
Jesuits as intermediaries and openly courted an alliance with the British that would render their
political relationship with the Society of Jesus moot. Nevertheless, the few remaining Jesuits
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would take up their old mantle as agents and arbitrators of empire during the crises of the British
regime in the pays d’en haut.4
The British conquest of New France created a powerful anxiety in the Jesuit missionaries
over their place in the new regime. Fearful over their fate at British hands, some chose to flee to
Louisiana and faced expulsion as their order was abolished in France. Others, such as Du Jaunay
and Potier, resolved to make themselves valuable to the new order by encouraging the Natives
and French settlers and fur traders to consent to British rule. Pontiac’s War provided them an
opportunity to demonstrate their suspect loyalty to the new regime and to potentially reclaim a
portion of their diplomatic power held previously under the French.
The British, ever suspicious of the black-robed priests who had opposed them for over a
century, refused to grant the Jesuits their old prominence. While local officials at Detroit and
Michilimackinac as well as tribal chiefs among the Wyandot and Kiskakon Odawa rediscovered
the Jesuit potential to aid their cause, officials stationed in Quebec, New York, and Pennsylvania
insulated from the direct conflict did not recognize their contributions, pushing instead to expel
the Jesuits and all French-Canadians from the interior. Despite these suspicions, the interior
French remained in their long-established position in the west. British fur traders needed them to
act as middlemen between themselves and the western tribes due to the longstanding friendship
and frequent kinship bonds between the French and the Natives. The interior French remained in
the west well beyond the American Revolution.5
The Jesuits, however, lost what little place they had left. Expelled from Louisiana and
removed from their remaining enclaves at Kahnawake and Michilimackinac, the Jesuits who had
roamed the interior and influenced empire and colonialism in French North America for over a
4
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century disappeared from the continent outside of Detroit, Quebec, and Maryland. Though the
order maintained a small presence in British Canada until the papal act of suppression in 1773,
only Potier remained of the Jesuits in the pays d’en haut.
Armand de la Richardie, after retiring to Quebec in 1751, became a professor at the Jesuit
seminary college. He was eventually promoted as the seminary’s vice superior in 1755 and
became the spiritual director at the Hotel-Dieu monastery in 1756. Richardie died in Quebec at
age seventy-two in 1758, just one year before the capture of the city. Pierre du Jaunay was forced
by financial circumstance to end his twenty-nine year tenure as missionary to the Odawa at
Michilimackinac in 1765. He left a deep impression upon those Odawa who knew him, some of
whom spoke of his missionary activities and prayers as late as 1824. He was appointed to be the
spiritual director of the Ursulines at Quebec in 1767, a post he enjoyed until his death at age
seventy-four in 1780.6
Potier spent the rest of his life on the south shore of Detroit in what is now Windsor,
Ontario. He was allowed to remain at his post after the international suppression of the Jesuits
because Archbishop Briand appointed him the pastor of the Parish of the Assumption at Detroit.
His parish grew so rapidly that he had to sell mission land to fund construction of a larger parish.
Wyandot and French settlers worshiped alongside each other at the mission and Potier remained
active as both a missionary to the tribe and a pastor to the French. Potier would have preferred
focusing entirely upon his mission to the Wyandot, however. He tried to enlist Rev. Pierre
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Gibault as an associate pastor to minister to the French so he could focus all his effort on the
Wyandot.7
The British commandants eventually came to respect Potier as a decent man and called
upon him to reaffirm the loyalties of the Detroit habitants during the American Revolution.
Potier’s own loyalties during the Revolution are complex. While he called upon the habitants to
honor their oaths of allegiance to the British Crown, he maintained a correspondence with an
American patriot named John Dodge. He met Dodge when the man was held captive at Detroit
during the war and maintained a correspondence even as Dodge aided George Rogers Clark’s
famous expedition into the pays d’en haut. That expedition eventually captured the Detroit
commandant and all his men at the Battle of Vincennes in 1779. Whether or not Potier aided the
Americans directly or indirectly if at all, Potier speaking with the British and Americans from
both corners of his mouth indicates his resolve to remain with his mission no matter who laid
claim to the Detroit River.8
Potier died in 1781 at the age of seventy-three after falling onto a fire poker that pierced
his skull. Potier was deeply mourned by the French habitants and traders but his sudden passing
especially aggrieved the Wyandot. The tribe mourned publically for the priest who ministered at
Detroit for nearly thirty years. The principal chiefs called a council after a period of mourning
and demanded a new missionary to fill the void, saying:
My father, in the name of God & of all the Huron nations, help us in our present need of a
missionary, the loss of Pere Poitier has left a general desolation in our villages, which
will only cease when he is replaced by another. Instructed from infancy in the principles
of the Christian religion, we follow them faithfully under the direction of our spiritual
7
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leaders; but today what have we become? The souls of our warriors will tremble
henceforth at the thought of death which follows them every moment, the blood of our
old men & of our women will freeze at the approach of the last moment of their lingering
lives, the mothers are distressed at the state of their children …9
The British allowed Jean-François Hubert, a diocesan priest, to assume Potier’s old office later
that same year.10
The fate of the Wyandot follows an all-too familiar pattern through the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries. More French and Anglo-American settlers relocated to Detroit as the
eighteenth century progressed, putting more pressure on the Wyandot. They and the other Detroit
tribes began to sell land to the newcomers, especially the French, until the newborn United States
of America was granted possession of Detroit in 1797. The Wyandot remained neutral to
imperial tensions during the American Revolution, but opted to oppose the Americans at the
Battle of Fallen Timbers in 1794 and to side with the British and their allies, the Native
confederacy organized and led by the Shawnee headman, Tecumseh. They aided in the capture
of Detroit during the War of 1812. The Americans did not forget this or Tecumseh’s confederacy
after the war’s conclusion gave Detroit back to the Americans. Subsequent federal laws
progressively shrank Wyandot land holdings until the tribe was forced to relocate in the 1820s.
Moving several times throughout the nineteenth century, the Wyandot tribe eventually settled in
Oklahoma and Kansas, where their descendants live to this day.11
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